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I. INTRODUCTION 
“They had learned nothing and forgotten nothing.”1 
A number of years have passed since the housing crisis of 2007–
2008, and by many accounts the overall economy is slowly but surely 
recovering.  Unemployment is generally decreasing, employers are 
beginning to add new jobs, and lenders and other financial institutions 
are easing up their hold on credit.2  And importantly—a mere five short 
 1. DAVID LAWDAY, NAPOLEON'S MASTER: A LIFE OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND (2007) (the phrase 
is attributed to the prince de Talleyrand, the famous foreign minister of France, who commented that 
despite having been violently driven from the throne on account of generations of abuse, greed, and 
neglect of duty, upon the restoration of the French crown to the Bourbon royal family they evidenced 
that they had learned nothing from the revolution, and quickly settled back into their prior despotic and 
corrupt ways). 
 2.  Patrice Hill, Jobs: U.S. Private Sector Finally Makes Up Recession’s Losses, WASH. TIMES 
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years since the crisis—private sector employment levels have reached 
above what they were prior to the Great Recession.3  As of this writing, 
the unemployment rate hovers around 6.7% (down from its one-time 
high of over 10%),4 and various areas of the private sector are on the 
rise—including construction, healthcare, hospitality, and an array or 
professional business services.5  And lastly, due to a surge in consumer 
spending, employers have increased their workweek by 0.2 hours.6  
Because of this upswing in the economy, however unhurried it might 
be, it is tempting to push aside the abusive practices of past, mostly 
perpetrated by many of the nation’s largest financial institutions and 
lenders, which brought the economy to its knees in the first place.7  With 
a feeling of renaissance, revival, and optimism in the air, letting bygones 
be bygones seems to roll off the tongue. 
Looking back to the aftermath of the crash, when the housing bubble 
burst and a massive wave of mortgage defaults and accompanying 
foreclosures swept across the United States, the national economy—so 
intimately tied to the housing market through the widespread trading of 
mortgage-backed securities—was substantially broken.8  In an effort to 
deal with widespread and unprecedented foreclosures, banks began 
engaging in various practices in order to help speed up the foreclosure 
process—even when those practices included foreclosures that were 
either illegal or fraudulent.9  In response to the economic crisis the 
federal government stepped in and passed several rounds of financial 
bailouts aimed at stabilizing the financial sector and stemming the 
ongoing damage to the economy.10  Further, in an effort to prevent a 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id.  
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Joseph William Singer, Foreclosure and the Failures of Formality, or Subprime Mortgage 
Conundrums and How to Fix Them, 46 CONN. L. REV. 497, 500 (2013). 
 8.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 9.  Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in 
Bankruptcy, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 565 (2009); Gregg H. Mosson, Robosigning Foreclosures: How it 
Violates Law, Must be Stopped, and Why Mortgage Law Reform is Needed to Ensure the Certainty and 
Values of Real Property, 40 W. ST. U. L. REV. 31 (2012); Tami Luhby, Robo-Signing: Just the Start of 
Bigger Problems, CNN MONEY (Oct. 22, 2010), 
http://money.cnn.com/2010/10/22/real_estate/foreclosure_paperwork_problems/; Christopher L. 
Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185 (2007); Christopher L. Peterson, 
Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 78 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1359 (2010). 
 10.  See Robert Chote, Financial Crisis: Someone Will Have to Dig Us Out of All This Debt, 
DAILY TELEGRAPH (Oct. 8, 2008 10:57PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/3161595/Financial-Crisis-Someone-will-have-to-dig-us-
out-of-all-this-debt.html; Landon Thomas & Eric Dash, Seeking Fast Deal, JPMorgan Quintuples Bear 
Stearns Bid, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/25/business/25bear.html?_r=0; Joe Nocera, Propping Up a House of 
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future crash, Congress also passed comprehensive legislation known as 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the 
Dodd-Frank Act).11  This act, among other things, amended a host of 
federal lending and banking statutes and established a new federal 
agency, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, to protect 
consumers in all forms of financial transactions going forward.12  
Although virtually nothing was done to directly reform the secondary 
mortgage market13 and despite the criticism of many that the new law 
did not go far enough,14 its proponents lauded the Dodd-Frank Act as 
having made major inroads toward reigning in financial sector abuses.15  
However, as for those unscrupulous lenders whose practices led to the 
disaster, few have been punished and most have received only a simple 
slap on the wrist for their transgressions.16  As markets and financial 
institutions adjust themselves to this new regulatory landscape, for many 
it appears that the housing market and the economy has returned, at least 
in part, to business as usual.17 
Cards, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/28/business/28nocera.html?dbk; 
Deborah Solomon, Light At the End of the Bailout Tunnel, Wall St. J. (Apr. 12, 2010 12:01AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230484650457517795002988669; CONG. BUDGET 
OFFICE, THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: REPORT ON TRANSACTIONS THROUGH DECEMBER 
31, 2008 (2009), available at http://www.cbo.gov/publication/41754. 
 11.  Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 
12, 15, and 31 U.S.C); see also Damian Paletta, It Has A Name: The Dodd/Frank Act, WALL STREET J. 
(Jun. 25, 2010), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/06/25/it-has-a-name-the-doddfrank-act/; Reza 
Dibadj, Dodd-Frank: Toward First Principles?, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 79 (2011); Gary L. Goldberg, Dodd-
Frank Act at One Year: An Overview, 65 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 229 (2011). 
 12.  Alan S. Kaplinsky, CFPB Announces 2013 Regulatory Agenda, 66 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. 
REP. 418 (2012); Steve Forry, The CFPB in Review: A Healthy Dose of Enforcement and a Dash of 
Setting Boundaries, BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP., Oct. 2013, at 1; Jean Eaglesham, Warning 
Shot On Financial Protection, WALL STREET J., Feb. 9, 2011 12:01AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870350780457613037086226325. 
 13.  Nathan A. Hertzog, Regulatory Future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 31 REV. BANKING 
& FIN. L. 62 (2011). 
 14.  Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the 
Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951 (2011). 
 15.  See Forry supra note 12; Adam J. Levitind, Andrey D. Pavlovdd, & Susan M. Wachter, The 
Dodd-Frank Act and Housing Finance: Can it Restore Private Risk to the Securitization Market?, 29 
YALE J. ON REG. 101, 155 (2012).   
 16.  See Another Slap on the Wrist for Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/09/opinion/another-slap-on-the-wrist-for-big-banks.html?_r=0; Erika 
Eichelberger, JPMorgan Chase Gambles Away $6B, Gets "Slap on the Wrist", MOTHER JONES (Jan. 15, 
2013 6:33PM), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2013/01/jpmorgan-chase-federal-reserve-
enforcement-action-london-whale-money-laundering; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: 
Why Washington Keeps Giving in to Wall Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283 (2013); Still No Justice for 
Mortgage Abuses, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/02/opinion/sunday/still-no-justice-for-mortgage-abuses.html. 
 17.  See Paul Wiseman, A Recovering US is Outpacing Other Major Economies, CNS News 
(Apr. 6, 2014 10:03AM), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/recovering-us-outpacing-other-major-
economies; Frank Islam & Ed Crego, Let's Grow Wall Street and Main Street Together in 2014, 
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But imagine Barry Tatum of Cook Country, Illinois, who, like so 
many American homeowners, fell behind on his mortgage payments 
during the economic downturn when his appraisal business began to 
struggle.18  Despite attempts to achieve a loan modification, the 
mortgage servicer began foreclosure proceedings.19  During the 
pendency of these proceedings Mr. Tatum continued to live in his home 
and continued exploring ways to avoid foreclosure.20  In the meantime, 
the mortgage servicer hired a third party property management firm, 
Safeguard, to “determine the occupancy status of the property and 
perform property preservation services” on the premises.21  One day 
when Mr. Tatum returned home from work prior to foreclosure, he 
found a note pinned to his front door that stated Safeguard—acting 
through one of its subcontractors—had determined that the mortgaged 
property was vacant.22  Mr. Tatum contacted Safeguard and notified 
them that the property was not vacant and that, indeed, he was still 
living in the property.23  Over the course of the following weeks 
vacancy notices continued to appear posted to his front door.24  After 
several months of this, Mr. Tatum stated that he returned home one day 
to find that his front door had been broken down by a sledgehammer, 
allegedly at the order of Safeguard who determined that the property 
was vacant and who then sent its subcontractor to secure the premises.25  
In a similar story, Sherry Eubanks of Will County, Illinois, defaulted 
on her mortgage loan payments because the preschool that she operated 
fell on hard times.26  The mortgage servicer thereafter foreclosed on her 
home.27  Nine days after the foreclosure sale, while Ms. Eubanks was 
out of the house but her fifteen year old daughter was at home alone, she 
claimed that subcontractors of Safeguard—again, hired by the mortgage 
servicer to “preserve the property if vacant”—knocked on the door with 
orders to winterize the “vacant” premises.28  Not recognizing the men 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 3, 2014 2:06PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/frank-islam/lets-grow-wall-
street-and_b_4698301.html; Reuters, U.S. Economy Grows At Fastest Pace In Almost 2 Years, 
Huffington Post (Dec. 20, 2013 8:40AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/20/economic-
growth-q3-2013_n_4479330.html. 
 18.  See Complaint at *7, The People of the State of Ill. v. Safeguard Properties, L.L.C., 2013 
WL 5290237 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2013). 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  See id. 
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knocking on the door, Ms. Eubanks’ daughter hid in an interior room of 
the house and called 9-1-1.29 Not to be deterred, one of the 
subcontractors allegedly broke a window and entered the house and 
thereafter unlocked the back door for the others to enter.30  Shortly 
thereafter, the police arrived and arrested the subcontractors.31  These 
alarming stories form part of the allegations against one major bank 
contractor that have been filed by the Attorney General of Illinois based 
on numerous complaints of break-in forecloses across that state.32 
As the economy continues to recover and the horrors and abuses of 
the financial crash of 2007–2008 begin to fade into the background, it is 
easy, perhaps even enticing, to embrace feelings of normality, calm, and 
business as usual.33  After the many bailouts, new laws, and public 
scolding accorded to mortgage lenders and other financial institutions 
after the crash, one would seem to think that the atrocities which 
pervaded the housing market and ultimately brought about the greatest 
economic downturn since the Great Depression would have signaled 
that these abusive practice were a thing of the past; indeed, lessons had 
been learned.34  In fact, in the face of the Dodd-Frank Act and other 
state consumer protection laws enacted after the crash, many declared 
that this new legal and regulatory framework would ensure that abuses 
similar to those in the past were unlikely to occur again.35  
Nevertheless, a number of lenders, through their third party property 
management firms, appear to be once again utilizing overly 
aggressive—and illegal—practices in order to expedite the foreclosure 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  See id. 
 32.  See infra Part II.C. 
 33.  Wiseman, supra note 17; Islam et al., supra note 17; Reuters, supra note 17. 
 34.  See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§§ 1400–32, 124 Stat. 1376, 2136–63 (addressing mortgage reform and predatory lending practices); 
John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks before the American Securitization Forum (Feb. 
2, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2010/pub-speech-2010-
13.pdf; see also Kaplinsky supra note 12; Forry supra note 12; Eaglesham, supra note 12. 
 35.  See generally Kevin Drawbaugh, White House Recommits to "Volcker Rule" Rank Trade 
Ban, REUTERS (Feb. 23, 2010 7:28PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/24/us-financial-
regulation-idUSTRE61L3UL20100224; Gretchen Morgenson, Strong Enough for Tough Stains?, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 26, 2010, at BU1; Binyamin Appelbaum & Brady Dennis, Legislation by Senator Dodd 
Would Overhaul Banking Regulators, WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 11, 2009), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/09/AR2009110901935.html; Wall 
Street Reform: The Dodd-Frank Act, The White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/economy/middle-
class/dodd-frank-wall-street-reform (last visited May 28, 2015); President Obama Signs Dodd-Frank 
Act Into Law, NAT’L L. REV. (July 21, 2010), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/president-obama-
signs-dodd-frank-act-law; Sarah N. Lynch, Obama To Meet with Financial Regulators on Wall Street 
Reform Law, REUTERS (Aug. 18, 2013 9:55PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/19/us-usa-
financial-obama-idUSBRE97I00V20130819; Michael Tomasky, Obama’s Big Success—Sort Of, N.Y. 
NAT’L REV. OF BOOKS, April 25, 2013, at 417. 
 
6
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol83/iss4/3
2015] BANKS, BREAK-INS, AND BAD ACTORS  1161 
process.36  The issues arising from these practices have become so 
pervasive that lawsuits have been filed in over thirty states, most 
aggressively in Illinois,37 and legal aid organizations in California, 
Florida, Michigan, Nevada, and New York report that complaints 
against lender-engaged property managements firms, particularly 
Safeguard Properties, Inc., number among their top complaints.38  
 Just as many noted commentators have written, the foreclosure crisis 
was caused in great part by a lack—or daresay a willful rejection—of 
legal formalities in order to steamroll foreclosure processes.39  These 
same motivations are driving the new foreclosure practices that have 
been allegedly utilized against distressed borrowers like Barry Tatum, 
Sherry Eubanks, and so many others.40 The use of third party property 
management firms by mortgage lenders/servicers to deal with defaulted 
mortgaged properties—without proper oversight or safeguards to ensure 
the fair treatment of borrowers and adherence to the law—has caused 
yet again another foreclosure scandal to emerge in the still-recovering 
housing market.41  Such abuse, so shortly after the crash and the 
enactment of a host of consumer protection and regulatory safeguards, 
exemplifies the ongoing need to closely monitor and supervise the 
mortgage finance market, both by the government and housing 
advocates and watchdog groups.42 It particularly shows the inadequacies 
of the so-called new and improved consumer protection laws against 
foreclosure abuses, and subsequently highlights how fragile the state of 
homeownership in this country remains.43 
 36.  Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Invasive Tactic in Foreclosures Draws Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 9, 2013, 8:23PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/09/invasive-tactic-in-foreclosures-draws-
scrutiny/; Bank Contractors Illegally Break Into Homes Across the US, RT NEWS (July 19, 2012, 
9:22PM), http://rt.com/usa/us-bank-home-safeguard-617/; Jeff Rossen & Avni Patel, Home Break-ins: 
Bank Contractors Accused of Cleaning Out Wrong Homes, TODAY (Oct. 2, 2013, 7:46AM), 
http://www.today.com/news/home-break-ins-bank-contractors-accused-cleaning-out-wrong-homes-
8C11296802; Chris Morran, Homeowners Win Lawsuit Over Fraudulent Foreclosure But May Still 
Lose House, CONSUMERIST (Nov. 1, 2012), http://consumerist.com/2012/11/01/homeowners-win-
lawsuit-over-fraudulent-foreclosure-but-may-still-lose-house/; Melissa Yeager, Safeguard Properties 
Faces Lawsuits in Five States, 7NEWSDENVER (April 30, 2013), 
http://www2.thedenverchannel.com/web/kmgh/news/local-news/safeguard-properties-faces-lawsuits-in-
five-states. 
 37.  See Yeager, supra note 36. 
 38.  Silver-Greenberg, supra note 36. 
 39.  Singer, supra note 7; David A. Dana, Why Mortgage “Formalities” Matter, 24 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 505 (2012); Christopher L. Peterson, Two Faces: Demystifying the Mortgage 
Electronic Registration System’s Land Title Theory, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 111 (2011); Jean 
Braucher, Form and Substance in Consumer Financial Protection, 7 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN., & COM. L. 
107 (2012). 
 40.  Silver-Greenberg, supra note 36. 
 41.  See id. 
 42.  See generally id. 
 43.  See Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of Homeownership, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 329 (2009) (noting 
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This Article explores these lender-engaged third party property 
management firms—seemingly the next installment in the ongoing saga 
of housing market exploitations—and their abusive foreclosure 
practices.  Part II gives an overview of the fraudulent practices that 
precipitated the housing crash of 2007–2008.44  This includes a 
discussion of both the federal government’s response to the crash, as 
well as the ways in which federal and state prosecutors attempted to call 
banks to task and prohibit future abuses through the National Mortgage 
Settlement of 2012.45  Part III explores this new wave of mortgage 
abuses—break-in foreclosures—and investigates the connection 
between property management firms and the banks that hire them.46  
This part also investigates more closely the recent litigation that has 
spawned from these incidents of break-in foreclosures.47  Part IV 
criticizes current laws and regulations that purport to provide a remedy 
to or protection against homeowner abuse in the foreclosure process, 
pointing out their inadequacies, lack of reliability, and systemic 
deficiencies in remedying and preventing the problem.48  Lastly, Part V 
calls for state and federal action as it relates to break-in foreclosures by 
making a three-part recommendation for the implementation of third 
party provider oversight regulations, the creation of a private cause of 
action for aggrieved homeowners, and for the stricter regulation of 
property preservation clauses in mortgage contracts.49 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF PAST FORECLOSURE FRAUD AND ABUSE 
Prior to subprime lending and mortgage securitization, banks were 
genuinely concerned about the financial status of their borrowers 
because the bank itself was incurring a real risk by extending credit.50  
However, this system of having “skin in the game” would soon fade 
away as banks and financial institutions found innovative ways to 
unload mortgages and thereby shift the risk in the long term and obtain 
upfront capital in the short term.51   
that other government programs nominally aimed at enhancing and protecting homeownership—such as 
the mortgage interest deduction—produce paradoxically opposite results). 
 44.  See infra Part II. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  See infra Part III. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  See infra Part IV. 
 49.  See infra Part V. 
 50.  See David R. Greenberg, Neglected Formalities in the Mortgage Assignment Process and 
the Resulting Effects on Residential Foreclosures, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 253 (2010); See Singer, supra note 
7. 
 51.  See Greenberg, supra note 50, at 256–58. 
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A. Abusive Practices Leading Up to the Housing Crisis 
The mortgage lending abuses that led to the housing crisis were born 
out of a combination of subprime lending and the securitization of 
mortgages.52  Both of these together helped form the basis for a system 
that would ultimately speed toward a crashing and disastrous end.53  
1. Subprime Lending—Stacking the Deck 
Beginning in or around the early 1990s, individuals who lacked the 
ability to qualify for credit under customary underwriting standards 
were nevertheless granted mortgage loans by banks across the country.54  
These subprime borrowers—who almost always failed to understand the 
nature of the documents they were signing or the obligations they were 
incurring—were enticed to enter into these credit agreements by 
promises of low interest rates on the front end, which would only adjust 
to a higher rate a few years into the term of the loan.55   
Although these borrowers lacked the ability to make their mortgage 
payments once the interest rates spiked, they often thought they would 
be able to refinance their debt for another low interest rate before that 
time would arrive.56  Under these auspices, subprime mortgage lending 
flourished such that “subprime mortgages grew from five percent to 
over twenty percent of all new mortgages” between the years 1994 to 
2004.57 
2. Mortgage Securitization—Building the House of Cards 
The securitization process involved a labyrinthine scheme of buying, 
selling, swapping, and insuring intricate—and almost always poorly 
conceived—legal instruments that comprised a host of mortgage/credit 
rights through various nominees of the true parties.58  This system 
started with the lending institution that initially made the loan to the 
borrower.59  This could be either a banking institution or a mortgage 
 52.  See id. at 256–58. 
 53.  See id. 
 54.  Id. See also Gerald Korngold, Legal and Policy Choices in the Aftermath of the Subprime 
and Mortgage Financing Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 727 (2009). 
 55.  See Greenberg, supra note 50 (citations omitted). 
 56.  Id.  
 57.  Id. at 254–55. 
 58.  ANDREW DAVIDSON, ANTHONY SANDERS, LAN-LING WOLFF, & ANNE CHING, 
SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURING AND INVESTMENT ANALYSIS (2003). 
 59.  Id. 
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broker (in either case, this party was called the mortgage originator).60  
The originator would, nominally at least, review the credit history, 
employment status, and other financial indicators of the borrower and 
assess whether the prospective borrower had the ability to repay the 
loan.61  It was at this stage of the transaction that subprime borrowers—
those who, by all accounts, could not repay the loan—were nevertheless 
approved for credit.62  The borrower would receive the purchase funds 
in the form of loan proceeds and would contemporaneously sign a 
promissory note and a mortgage on the property.63  
Next, almost immediately, the mortgage originator would sell the 
mortgage and the note to a third party called an issuer or an arranger.64  
These arrangers would purchase hundreds and thousands of mortgages 
and notes from various mortgage originators from across the country 
and, by combining them together, created a form of security (like stock 
or a bond) that could then be bought, sold, or traded on the open market 
to third party investors, typically through buying a nominal interest in a 
trust that would have ownership of the mortgage pool.65  From this 
point, although nothing had changed in terms of the borrower’s position, 
the mortgage payments no longer were directed at the originator.66 
Rather, the third party investors who purchased interests in the 
securitized pool of mortgages rely upon yet another third party—a 
mortgage-servicing agent—to handle the monthly collection of note 
payments and to otherwise deal directly with the borrower.67 
Naturally, the ability of mortgage lenders to off-load their risk to third 
parties almost immediately upon making the risky loan removed a major 
protection for borrowers.68  Under historical lending practices the bank 
assumed the risk that a default might occur if the borrower was unable 
 60.  Id.; see also Greenberg, supra note 50. 
 61.  See Singer, supra note 7 (citing Yuliya Guseva, Evolutionary Developments in Mortgage 
Securitization: Financial Law Reforms, Putative Beneficiaries, and Archetypal Economic Risks, 21 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS, 395, 435–36, 464 (2012)). 
 62.  Id.  
 63.  See Greenberg supra note 50. 
 64.  See id.; see also Katherine Porter, Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage 
Claims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 121 (2009). 
 65.  ADAM B. ASHCRAFT & TIL SCHUERMANN, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIZATION OF 
SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CREDIT 5 (2008); see also generally DAVIDSON ET AL, supra note 58. 
 66.  Nolan Robinson, Note, The Case Against Allowing Mortgage Electronic Registration 
Systems, Inc. (MERS) to Initiate Foreclosure Proceedings, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, (2011); see 
Singer, supra note 7; see also Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and 
the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 78 U. CIN L. REV. 1359 (2010). 
 67.  See Greenberg, supra note 50; see also Porter, supra note 64. For a fuller discussion and 
overview of the events that precipitated the housing crisis, see CHRISTOPHER SERKIN, THE LAW OF 
PROPERTY: CONCEPTS AND INSIGHTS (2012). 
 68.  See Singer, supra note 7. 
 
10
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol83/iss4/3
2015] BANKS, BREAK-INS, AND BAD ACTORS  1165 
to pay.69  Due to this risk, banks were very concerned about the credit-
worthiness of their borrowers, since a failure to adequately assess a 
borrower’s financial position could result in a direct hit to the bank.70   
But, with the ability to sell the loan immediately after making it, this 
borrower protection, originally built into the system of lending, was 
completely eviscerated.71  A bank need not worry about the quality of 
the borrower since a subsequent default would be someone else’s 
problem.72  This was especially true since in the early years of 
adjustable rate subprime loans the borrower was indeed able to make the 
monthly payments.73  It would not be until about two to three years into 
the loan, when the originator bank had long since sold the loan to a third 
party, that the rate would adjust and become too high for the borrower to 
make the debt service.74  And to add yet another defective wheel to the 
cart, the mortgage servicer who was charged with dealing with the 
borrower—including addressing any issues that may arise if the 
borrower became behind on his payments—was financially incentivized 
by virtue of the servicing agreement to work in favor of neither the 
interest of the borrower nor the owner of the loan.75 
3. The Housing Bubble’s Burst—When It All Came Crashing 
Down 
This defective system, underpinned by greed and buttressed by 
artificial home prices, finally came crashing down beginning in 2006.76  
As property values decreased, subprime borrowers, who up until now 
believed they could refinance their debt before the adjustable interest 
rates spiked, found themselves unable to do so.77  Because they could 
not continue to enjoy their relatively low monthly payments, and 
because they could not sustain these now adjusted and much higher debt 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id.  
 72.  See id. (citing David Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow 
Predatory Lending to Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985 (2006)). 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  See id. (citations omitted). 
 76.  See Chad D. Emerson, A Troubled House of Cards: Examining How the Housing and 
Economic Recovery Act of 2008 Fails to Resolve the Foreclosure Crisis, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 561 (2008); 
Singer, supra note 7; Brooksley Born, Foreword: Deregulation: A Major Cause of the Financial Crisis, 
5 HARVARD L. & POL’Y REV. 231, 233 (2011); Gregory Zuckerman et al., U.S. Charges Goldman Sachs 
With Fraud—SEC Alleges Firm Misled Investors on Securities Linked to Subprime Mortgages; Firm 
Vows to Fight the Charges, WALL STREET J., Apr. 17, 2010, at A1; see Greenberg, supra note 50, at 
259–62. 
 77.  See Singer, supra note 7, at 507. 
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obligations, they defaulted en masse.78 In turn, banks—or, rather, their 
mortgage servicers—began to foreclose on these defaulted properties 
across the United States.79  However, because these properties were 
underwater—meaning that the mortgage debt encumbering these 
properties was far in excess of the actual value of the property that it 
secured—foreclosure sales failed to bring in an amount sufficient for the 
banks to recover their loss.80  As a result, banks were forced to purchase 
the mortgaged property themselves, which thereby created a situation 
where lending institutions became the owners of a massive number of 
foreclosed properties—a role for which they were entirely unfit and 
unprepared.81  
Since borrowers were no longer making payments under their loans, 
the market for the many mortgage-backed securities that were now in 
the hands of various financial institutions, pension funds, and other 
investors came crashing down.82  In essence, these mortgage-backed 
securities that had come to permeate the entire United States economy 
and reach into every sector became almost valueless.  As one noted 
commentator stated, this set off “a disastrous chain of events affecting 
the secondary mortgage markets, the broader financial sectors, and the 
entire United States—and global—economy.”83  Moreover, many 
individuals lost their jobs as a result of this chain of events and, although 
previously financially capable of making their monthly mortgage 
payments, also defaulted.84  This resulted in yet more foreclosures and 
more bank-owned properties.85  By one estimate these otherwise prime 
borrowers comprised sixty percent (60%) of all mortgage defaults in 
2006 alone.86 
4. Foreclosures Fraud—The Rise of Robosigning 
As the massive wave of defaults swept across the country, lenders 
were forced to initiate foreclosure proceedings quickly in an attempt to 
rehabilitate the defaulted properties and sell them to third party 
 78.  See Greenberg, supra note 50, at 260–63 (citations omitted). 
 79.  See id. 
 80.  Richard H. Thaler, Underwater, but Will They Leave the Pool?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2010, 
at BU3; see also Singer, supra note 7, at 534 (citing Robert C. Hockett, Paying Paul and Robbing No 
One: An Eminent Domain Solution for Underwater Mortgage Debt, 19 CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON. & 
FIN. 1, 6–7 (2013)). 
 81.  See Singer, supra note 7, at 534; see also Korngold, supra note 54. 
 82.  See Greenberg, supra note 50; see also Korngold, supra note 54. 
 83.  See Greenberg, supra note 50. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id.   
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purchasers, thereby recouping their losses.87  Interestingly, as many 
scholars have noted,88 mortgage lenders were attempting to create a sort 
of nation-wide system of real estate transfers through the mortgage 
securitization system.  In this way, interests in property (mortgage 
interest, to be exact) were sold, bought, and traded far and wide across 
different markets through a fairly informal system.89  However, property 
law—including the law of mortgages—is governed primarily by state 
law, which varies depending on the jurisdiction.90  This extends, in turn, 
to the ways in which mortgagees can foreclosure on property.91  
Although foreclosures can occur either through a judicial or 
extrajudicial process—the availability of which depends upon the 
jurisdiction92—each type of process involves a strict adherence to state 
law procedural steps and necessary borrower safeguards to ensure that 
there is no overreaching by the creditor.93 
Since the process of foreclosing on property is so elaborate and 
requires the observance of so many requirements, foreclosing lenders 
are charged with conducting a great deal of due diligence and exercising 
great prudence before initiating such proceedings against a defaulting 
borrower.94  “These procedures reflect the need to assure that ownership 
rights in property are neither extinguished nor created in an environment 
with inadequate legal circumscriptions.”95  As a general matter, the 
foreclosing party must ensure that they have the legal authority to 
enforce the mortgage, that they have the correct description of the 
 87.  Gloria J. Liddell & Pearson Liddell, Jr., Robo Signers: The Legal Quagmire of Invalid 
Residential Foreclosure Proceedings and the Resultant Potential Impact upon Stakeholders, 16 CHAP. 
L. REV. 367, 371–73 (2012). 
 88.  See Singer, supra note 7; see also Tanya Marsh, Foreclosures and the Failure of the 
American Land Title Recording System, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 19, 23 (2011); Dale A. Whitman, 
Reforming the Law: The Payment Rule as a Paradigm, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1169; Dustin A. Zacks, 
Standing in Our Own Sunshine: Reconsidering Standing, Transparency, and Accuracy in Foreclosures, 
29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 551, 559–60 (2011); Dale A. Whitman, Are We There Yet? The Case for a 
Uniform Electronic Recording Act, 24 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 245 (2002); David E. Woolley & Lisa D. 
Herzog, MERS: The Unreported Effects of Lost Chain of Title on Real Property Owners, 8 HASTINGS 
BUS. L.J. 365, 401 (2012). 
 89.  See generally Singer, supra note 7 (“One of the striking features of the subprime era is that 
banks acted without adequate regard for state property law. They were intent on serving the national and 
international financial markets with new and more profitable products, and they treated state property 
law as an obstacle to get around rather than a foundation on which to build.”). 
 90.  See Liddell & Liddell, supra note 87, at 371–73. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. (“Twenty states allow only judicial foreclosures, five states allow only non-judicial 
foreclosures, with the remaining states allowing for both procedures.”). 
 93.  Id. (citing Prentiss Cox, Foreclosure Reform Amid Mortgage Lending Turmoil: A Public 
Purpose Approach, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 683, 698 (2008)). Additional foreclosure protections also exist 
under federal law. See id. 
 94.  See Liddell & Liddell, supra note 87. 
 95.  Id. at 376. 
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mortgaged property, that the actions of the borrower validly constitute a 
default and therefore trigger a right to foreclose, and that the proper 
parties who are entitled to notice of the foreclosure according to state 
law and constitutional due process considerations are served.96  Any 
defect in the process or failure to follow the necessary procedural steps 
can result in an illegal foreclosure.97 
In the wake of the housing crisis, as more and more properties came 
up for foreclosure, lenders and their mortgage servicers began to realize 
that, by virtue of the overly informal—and some say haphazard—
documentation of the transfer of mortgages from one party to another 
over the course of time that many of the essential documents required to 
foreclosure, such as the original promissory note, were unable to be 
found.98  Then a host of additional issues arose over whether the 
mortgage servicer had the right to foreclose on the property at all if the 
nominee listed on the mortgage was MERS, a privately-run clearing 
house which operated in lieu of proper assignments of the promissory 
notes secured by the mortgages.99  There were broken chains in the 
transfers of the mortgage from one investor to the next, therefore cutting 
off the ability to show a clean chain of title to the promissory note all the 
way back to the original lender.100  Additional questions arose as to 
whether, although the note continued to be transferred nominally 
through the MERS system, the note and the mortgage had been 
impermissibly separated from one another, thereby causing the holder of 
only the security right (the mortgage) to lack the ability to enforce the 
device due to its failure to also hold the principal obligation (the 
note).101  
Lenders and their mortgage servicers began to realize that the system 
they had created produced a framework of defects and broken parts that 
would ultimately render them unable to foreclose through the traditional 
legal process.102  In order to accommodate this defective system and 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. (citing Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006); Henry N. Butler & Jason S. Johnson, 
Reforming State Consumer Protection Liability: An Economic Approach, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 
74 (2010)). 
 98.  See Singer, supra note 7, at 522–23. 
 99.  See id.  at 525 (citing Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 274 (1872) (“The note and 
mortgage are inseparable; the former as essential, the latter as an incident. An assignment of the note 
carries the mortgage with it, while an assignment of the latter alone is a nullity . . . A mortgage may be 
enforced only by, or in behalf of, a person who is entitled to enforce the obligation the mortgage 
secures.”)). 
 100.  See Woolley & Herzog, supra note 88. 
 101.  See Singer, supra note 7, at 515–18; see also Robinson, supra note 66; Peterson, supra note 
66; Dale A. Whitman, A Proposal for a National Mortgage Registry: MERS Done Right, 78 MO. L. 
REV. (2013); Merscorp, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81, 83 (N.Y. 2006). 
 102.  Singer, supra note 7. 
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thereby still allow lenders to foreclose on their mortgages, courts began 
allowing the submission of affidavits whereby the foreclosing party 
would swear to the court, under oath, that it was indeed the legal title 
holder of the promissory note and had the full authority to foreclose on 
the property.103   
Of course, this abbreviated procedure was dependent upon the 
assumption that the foreclosing party had conducted the necessary due 
diligence to ensure that the information to which they were swearing in 
the affidavit was indeed correct.104  This would involve going through 
various documents, assignments, MERS records, and records contained 
in the various state recording systems to ensure that title to the debt 
could be validated.105  
Nevertheless, banks faced with so many foreclosures and 
hemorrhaging money from their immense losses would often hire only a 
few individuals to investigate the foreclosure records and sign the 
affidavits.106  Quickly these individuals would begin signing the 
affidavits without conducting any due diligence at all—asserting the 
lender’s right to the promissory note without the slightest clue as to 
whether this could be substantiated.107  This practice became known as 
“robosigning” since the bank official would sign the affidavits, almost 
as a mere matter of course, with relatively little concern as to their 
authenticity.108  Oftentimes a bank would “employ only one person to 
sign up to 10,000 foreclosure affidavits per month.”109  
The first litigation involving robosigning began in Florida110 and 
thereafter spread to a host of states across the country with financial 
watch-dogs and housing advocates decrying this practice as stemming 
from the very same type of fraud and neglect that caused the crash in the 
 103.  See id.  at 524–25. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. (“For this to work the way it is supposed to, the banks actually have to research each 
mortgage, find the note, and explain the evidence that leads the bank to believe that it actually has the 
right to foreclose on the property. But if there is no clear chain of title and the note has been lost, what 
evidence would suffice?”). 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Richard E. Gottlieb et al., The Foreclosure Firestorm: “Robo-Signing” Allegations Have 
More Bark than Bite, 67 BUS. LAW. 649 (2012); Matthew B. Banks, Prima Facie Validity of Proofs of 
Claims in the Age of “Robo-Signers”, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 54 (2011); Olga Kogan, Infinite Loop: 
Robo-Signers and Ethics in Bankruptcy Mortgage Cases, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 645 (2012); 
Raymond H. Brescia, Leverage: State Enforcement Actions in the Wake of Robo-Sign Scandal, 64 ME. 
L. REV. 17 (2011). 
 109.  See Greenberg, supra note 50 (citing See Ariana Eunjung Cha, Ally Financial Legal Issue 
with Foreclosures May Affect Other Mortgage Companies, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2010, 5:37 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/21/AR2010092105872.html). 
 110.  See Liddell & Liddell, supra note 87 (citation omitted). 
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first place.111  Thus began the precursor to break-in foreclosures 
whereby many property management firms forcibly and illegally 
maneuvered the foreclosure system so as to essentially divest the owner 
of his rights in without the observance of the necessary legal 
protections.112  
B. Federal Intervention and the Bank Bailouts 
In response to the ongoing crisis, and while robosigning still 
persisted, the federal government stepped in to try and blunt the harsh 
effects of the subprime mortgage meltdown.113  Various financial 
institutions, retirement funds, and pension funds across the country—
touching upon every facet of American life—had invested in these pools 
of mortgage-backed securities, believing them to be safe investments 
and assured of their financial health by a corrupt system created and 
perpetuated by mortgage originators and rating agencies.114  For 
instance, in a 2008 report Merrill Lynch acknowledged that as a result of 
its investments in these mortgage-backed securities that $30.6 billion of 
the institution’s holdings were only worth a fifth of their original 
value.115  Thus, when many mortgage-backed securities became 
valueless as a result of the tremendous wave of defaults, the cancer 
spread quickly throughout the entire economy.116  In order to help 
stabilize this growing economic malignancy, in October of 2008 
Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) 
and the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA).117 
 111.  See Gottlieb et al., supra note 108; see also Banks, supra note 108. 
 112.  See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970) (“[C]onsideration of what procedures due 
process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise 
nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by 
governmental action.”). 
 113.  Archit Shah, Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 569 
(2008); Stephen F.J. Ornsteina et al., The  Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, 61 CONSUMER 
FIN. L.Q. REP. 944 (2007); Adam Veness, The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 28 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 384 (2009). 
 114.  See Singer, supra note 7 (citing Andrew Ross Sorkin & Mary Williams Walsh, U.S. Accuses 
S & P of Fraud in Suit on Loan Bundles, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2013, at A1; John M. Griffin & Dragon 
Yongjun Tang, Did Subjectivity Play a Role in CDO Credit Ratings?, 67 J. FIN. 1293–96 (2012)). 
 115.  Bradley Keoun, Merrill Sells $8.55 Billion of Stock, Unloads CDOs (Update2), 
BLOOMBERG (July 29, 2008, 5:06PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=atfHM8sh2xtw&refer=us. 
 116.  See Greenberg, supra note 50; see also generally BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL 
THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2010). 
 117.  See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–289, 122 Stat. 2654 
(2008) (commonly referred to as HERA); Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110–343, 122 Stat. 3765 (commonly referred to as EESA); see also Ornsteina et al., supra note 113. 
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1. Government Purchasing of Toxic CMS from Financial 
Institutions 
Among other things, ESSA authorized the Department of the 
Treasury to spend up to seven hundred billion ($700,000,000.00) to 
purchase toxic mortgage-backed securities from various financial 
institutions in order to help clear their books and return these entities to 
some form of economic health.118  The formal name to this purchasing 
initiative was known as the Troubled Asset Repurchase Program, but it 
is more frequently known by its more popular moniker: TARP.119 EESA 
also allowed the secretary of the Treasury to use some of these funds to 
help distressed homeowners avoid foreclosure.120   
Various lending institutions—most of whom participated actively in 
the system of mortgage securitization and subprime lending that caused 
the crisis, as well as engaged in the robosigning epidemic that followed 
thereafter—received remarkable amounts of taxpayer money in order to 
stay afloat.121  For instance, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, and 
Wells Fargo all received twenty-five billion dollars and both Morgan 
Stanley and Goldman Sachs received ten billion dollars.122  In exchange 
for the purchasing of these asset-backed securities, the financial 
institutions were made to issue equity warrants whereby the federal 
government would take a type of ownership interest in the company that 
could then later be redeemed by the institutions by repaying the TARP 
monies.123 
2. Relief to Distressed Homeowners and the Secondary Market 
HERA, also passed in an effort to help heal the effects of the 
subprime mortgage crisis, attempted to create a program whereby the 
Treasury would again inject capital—amounting to roughly $300 
 118.  See Shah, supra note 113 (citing See David Cho & Neil Irwin, Crises of Confidence in the 
Markets; Federal Reserve's Rescue of Bear Stearns Exposes Cracks in Financial System, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 18, 2008, at A1). 
 119.  Id.; see also Jane K. Storero & Lawrence R. Wiseman, To Redeem or Not to Redeem: 
Considerations in Determining Whether to Exit the TARP Capital Purchase Program, 126 BANKING 
L.J. 625 (2009); Tae Yeon Kim, Pay It Back (TARP Developments), 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 538 
(2011); Daniel G. Murray & William H. Quirk, III, Rethinking Accepting TARP Capital Purchase 
Program Funds, 62 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 25 (2008). 
 120.  See Shah, supra note 113. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Matthew Ericson, Elaine He, & Amy Schoenfeld, Tracking the $700 Billion Bailout, N.Y. 
TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/national/200904_CREDITCRISIS/recipients.html (last 
visited May 28, 2015); see also Bailed Out Banks, CNN MONEY, 
http://money.cnn.com/news/specials/storysupplement/bankbailout/ (last visited May 28, 2015). 
 123.  See Shah, supra note 113. For an update of those financial institutions that have repaid their 
TARP funds, see CNN MONEY, supra note 122. 
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billion—into the mortgage market in order to entice lenders to forgive a 
portion of the unpaid debt owed by many distressed homeowners on 
their mortgage loans.124  Once again, lenders were given taxpayer 
money to make up for their own poor lending decisions.125  However, 
due to poor loan modification standards and bad timing, the general 
view was that the program came too little too late in the process to have 
a meaningful impact.126 
The other particularly important aspect of HERA was the 
government’s bailout of yet another set of financial institutions that had 
been at the heart of the subprime crisis—Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac.127  These two bodies, collectively called government-sponsored 
entities (GSEs), exist as a power player in the secondary mortgage 
market as both entities purchase mortgage-backed securities from 
financial institutions in order to increase liquidity in the mortgage 
finance market.128  However, unlike other private lending institutions, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are quasi-public bodies with their shares 
being privately traded on the stock exchange.129  It was always implied 
that those who invested in these two entities were, in essence, obtaining 
a government guarantee that their investment would not fail.130  
As a result of HERA, the GSEs were put into conservatorship by a 
new oversight agency created within the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development.131  And, once again, the Department of the 
Treasury was authorized to spend up to $100 billion dollars in taxpayer 
money to purchase equity in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and to also 
purchase toxic mortgage backed securities so that the two entities could 
 124.  Ornsteina et al., supra note 113. 
 125.  See id. 
 126.  See Emerson, supra note 76 (explaining the reasons for the various failures of HERA to 
make a meaningful impact on the housing crisis). 
 127.  Id. (citing Rob Alford, What Are the Origins of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae?, HISTORY 
NEWS NETWORK (Dec. 8, 2003), http:// hnn.us/articles/1849.html). 
 128.  Id.; see also Kate Pickert, A Brief History of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, TIME (July 14, 
2008), http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1822766,00.html. 
 129.  See Pickert, supra note 128; see also Emerson, supra note 76. 
 130.  See VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL., GUARANTEED TO FAIL: FANNIE MAE, FREDDIE MAC, AND 
THE DEBACLE OF MORTGAGE FINANCE (2011); see also generally OONAGH MCDONALD, FANNIE MAE 
AND FREDDIE MAC: TURNING THE AMERICAN DREAM INTO A NIGHTMARE (2012); CONG. BUDGET 
OFFICE, FANNIE MAE, FREDDIE MAC, AND THE FEDERAL ROLE IN THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE 
MARKET (2010). 
 131.  See Winston Sale, Effect of the Conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on 
Affordable Housing, 18 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 287 (2009); see also Cynthia 
M. Hajost, From Oversight to Conservatorship: What Does the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 
2008 Hold for GSES Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac?, 18 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. 
L. 3 (2008); Richard Scott Carnell, Handling the Failure of a Government-Sponsored Enterprise, 80 
WASH. L. REV. 565 (2005). 
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remove these nonperforming assets from their books.132  Without the 
bailout of these two entities—both of which had played a part in the 
housing crisis—both would have gone under.133  
Taken in context, it is rather extraordinary that in the midst of all 
these astonishing expenditures of public taxpayer money that the 
abusive practices related to break-in foreclosures, as further discussed 
below, have nevertheless taken root and spread.134 
C. State/Federal Litigation and the National Mortgage Settlement 
Finally, after years of standing by and allowing the subprime 
mortgage industry to flourish—as well as in reaction to revelations 
regarding robosigning—in October of 2010 the attorneys general of 
forty-nine states, as well as the U.S. Departments of Justice and Housing 
and Urban Development, filed suit against several of the country’s 
largest mortgage lenders—Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, 
Ally Financial, and Bank of America.135  The plaintiffs sought civil 
damages from these lending giants, premised on the fact that their 
“misconduct resulted in the issuance of improper mortgages, premature 
and unauthorized foreclosures, violation of service members’ and other 
homeowners’ rights and protections, the use of false and deceptive 
affidavits and other documents, and the waste and abuse of taxpayer 
funds.”136 The claim that these banks had engaged in premature and 
unauthorized foreclosure practices is particularly noteworthy since, as 
touched upon above and noted below, some of these same lenders would 
soon find themselves, through third party contractors, in the middle of 
yet another scandal involving foreclosure abuse.137   
In February of 2012, the defendants reached a $26 billion settlement 
with the states and the federal government.138  The settlement, at least in 
theory, was meant to not only impose penalties upon the banks, but also 
to create a new framework whereby the abuses of the past would be 
 132.  See Ornsteina et al., supra note 113; Nestor M. Davidson & Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Property 
in Crisis, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1607 (2010). 
 133.  See Davidson et al., supra note 132. 
 134.  See infra Part III. 
 135.  See Jessica Ziehler, The 2012 Mortgage Settlement with Large Banks, 32 REV. BANKING & 
FIN. L. 286 (2013). 
 136.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 137.  See generally id. 
 138.  Id.; see also Chris Isidore & Jennifer Liberto, Mortgage Deal Could Bring Billions in Relief, 
CNN MONEY (Feb. 15, 2012, 3:17PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2012/02/09/news/economy/mortgage_settlement/; Foreclosures (2012 
Robosigning and Mortgage Servicing Settlement), N.Y. TIMES, 
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prevented through prospective safeguards and new consumer-friendly 
regulations.139  But as seen from the allegations of break-ins and 
foreclosure intimidation experienced by the likes of Barry Tatum and 
Sherry Eubanks and others described below, the settlement’s goals were 
hardly met. 
1. Subsidies for Direct Homeowner Mortgage Relief 
The most significant aspect of the national mortgage settlement 
involved allocating $17 billion in direct aid to homeowners to assist 
them in paying down their mortgage principal.140  The theory being that 
since so many homeowners owed more on their homes than what their 
homes were actually worth, by allowing some of the debt to be forgiven 
it might be possible to “right size” these residential loans so that they 
would become healthy assets, both for the bank and for the borrower.141  
Additional funds were allocated to assist eligible borrowers in 
refinancing their home loans, as well as opening up the possibility of 
civil recourse for those homeowners who had lost their homes through 
wrongful foreclosure proceedings.142  Commentators noted that while 
these numbers sounded immense, the actual impact would prove to be 
de minims since so much of the damage had already been done and so 
many homeowners had long since lost their homes or would otherwise 
fail to meet the still stringent requirements to refinance.143 
2. Subsidies for Housing Planning Initiatives 
Further, nearly $3 billion was allocated from the settlement to various 
states to assist them in creating and enforcing more robust and strategic 
housing strategies.144  Some states used these funds for demolition of 
blighted areas, while others used the monies to fund more consumer 
protection prosecutions in pursuit of foreclosure abuse claims.145 
Under this portion of the settlement states were, in essence, given 
 139.  See Nelson D. Schwartz & Julie Creswell, New York Times, Mortgage Plan Gives Billions 
to Homeowners, but With Exceptions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/10/business/states-negotiate-26-billion-agreement-for-
homeowners.html. 
 140.  See Ziehler, supra note 135; see also About the National Mortgage Settlement, OFFICE OF 
MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT OVERSIGHT, https://www.mortgageoversight.com/about-the-mortgage-
settlement/#settlement-documents (last visited May 28, 2015) [hereinafter Mortgage Monitor]. 
 141.  See generally Ziehler, supra note 135. 
 142.  Id. at 289. 
 143.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. at 289–90. 
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discretionary funds for the purposes of testing ways in which a new and 
improved housing sector could be created, both to combat existing 
failures and to plan for the future.146  However, whether these funds 
were used in a meaningful way remains in question and only time will 
tell as to whether states have spent these one-time monies wisely.147 
3. A New Regulatory Framework for Mortgage Servicing 
But perhaps most importantly for purposes of this Article—and so as 
to better understand the legal and economic environment that led to 
break-in foreclosures—the settlement called for these five mortgage 
giants to reform the way in which they handled mortgage servicing.148 
Since a system of corruption, short cuts, and fraud—leading to practices 
such as robosigning, subprime lending, and misrepresentations as to the 
financial quality of mortgage-backed securities—had previously reigned 
over the mortgage market, the settlement called for new safeguards and 
disincentives to be implemented.149 
i. Putting a Stop to Robosigning 
The first mortgage servicing reform measure was meant to guarantee 
that affidavits could no longer be submitted in furtherance of foreclosure 
unless they were based on the signor’s personal knowledge of the facts 
that underlie the assertions in the document.150  This of course means 
that banks cannot claim to have legal title to the note and mortgage, and 
thus possess the right to foreclosure, unless they can actually 
substantiate such claims.151 
Furthermore, those within a mortgage servicing institution that are 
charged with signing the affidavits are now required to be under the 
supervision of trained employees to ensure the truthfulness of the 
 146.  See generally id. 
 147.  See generally id. 
 148.  Id. at 290 (citing Press Release, The White House, President Obama Speaks on Landmark 
Housing Settlement with Banks (Feb. 9, 2012) (transcript available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2012/02/09/president-obama-speaks-landmark-
housing-settlement-banks#transcript).  
 149.  Id.; see also Andrew R. Johnson, Regulators Pressure Mortgage Servicers, WALL STREET J. 
(Feb. 19, 2014, 6:31PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230363640457939340339246310. 
 150.  NAT’L MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT, RETURN INTEGRITY & ACCURACY TO FORECLOSURE AND 
BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS 1 (2013), available at 
https://d9klfgibkcquc.cloudfront.net/Servicing%20Standards%20Highlights.pdf [hereinafter MORTGAGE 
SERVICING PROVISIONS]. 
 151.  See id. 
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assertions.152  Banks are also required to provide an adequate number of 
signors so as to prevent having one person be charged with signing too 
many affidavits.153  Also, any compensation incentives to employees 
that encourage speedy signing or the production of high volumes are 
strictly prohibited.154  Lastly, foreclosing banks or servicers must 
specifically plead their authority to foreclosure when they initiate 
proceedings, and they must conduct quarterly reviews of foreclosure 
documents to ensure compliance.155     
ii. Oversight of Third Party Contractors 
Last, banks or servicers are required to “adopt procedures to oversee 
foreclosure trustees, independent contractors, and its agents including 
foreclosure firms, sub-servicers, agents, subsidiaries and affiliates.”156  
This last settlement provision was meant to ensure that those who act on 
behalf of foreclosing banks are properly monitored and supervised for 
compliance with the law.157  
These new third party oversight standards include the obligation of 
the servicer to conduct appropriate due diligence as to the qualifications, 
expertise, capacity, reputation, complaints, information security, 
document custody practices, business continuity, and financial viability 
of any third party contractors.158  The settlement also demands that the 
servicer must guarantee that agreements, contracts, or policies between 
the servicer and the third party provide for adequate oversight, which 
includes measures to enforce contractual rights and remedies and to 
provide timely action with regard to failures in performance.159  In the 
event of a bank contractor’s failure to perform its obligations or failure 
to meet the standards set forth by or imposed upon the servicer itself, the 
mortgage servicer must have a process for reviewing and addressing any 
customer complaints it receives in connection with these third party 
vendors.160  
In sum, the five defendant banks agreed in the settlement to put in 
place a host of new processes and internal protections so as to ensure the 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. at 1–2. 
 154.  Id. at 1. 
 155.  Id. at 1–2. 
 156.  Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  See, e.g., Exhibit A at A-12, U.S. v. Bank of America, No. 1:12-cv-00361-RMC (D.D.C. 
Feb. 12, 2013), available at https://www.jasmithmonitoring.com/omso/wp-
content/uploads/sites/4/2014/05/Servicing-Standards.pdf [hereinafter Settlement Term Sheet]. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. at A-13. 
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proper and legal administration of mortgage lending and foreclosures 
going forward.161  The rules in the settlement were drafted so as to be 
comprehensive, far-reaching, and systemic so that the types of abusive 
practices of the past would not happen again in the future.162  And, in 
light of such stringent oversight and political (as well as prosecutorial) 
pressure, one would surmise that mortgage lenders and their servicers 
would be on their best behavior (and ensure that their contractors would 
do the same) so as to prove that the sins of the past should be forgiven 
and the slate wiped clean.  But did the national mortgage settlement 
achieve these laudable goals, as the settlement’s oversight monitor 
claims?163  Or did it leave cracks in the walls, which would, over time, 
let in the same greed, fraud, and aggression that had plagued the 
residential mortgage market in the past?164   
III. THE NEW FACE OF FORECLOSURE ABUSE: PROPERTY MANAGEMENT 
CONTRACTORS 
In mid-2013, a flurry of articles began cropping up in newspapers and 
media outlets across the country telling stories of people returning to 
their homes at the end of a long day to find that all of their belongings 
had been taken and their property damaged.165  After investigating these 
break-ins, homeowners discovered that it was not a random thief that 
had been the intruder and caused the damage, but rather it was property 
management contractors, hired by the homeowners’ mortgage servicer, 
that had committed the acts.166  These bank contractors had been 
charged by the mortgage servicer to clean out and secure the premises 
until such time that the property could be sold at foreclosure.167  
Although in almost all cases the homeowner had defaulted or fallen 
 161.  See id. 
 162.  See Margaret Sullivan, Banking Troubles, but Not a Word About Fraud Claims, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 21, 2014, 3:42PM), http://publiceditor.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/04/21/banking-troubles-but-not-a-
word-about-fraud-claims/. 
 163.  Associated Press, Monitor: Big Banks Satisfy Mortgage Settlement, DAILY HERALD (Mar. 
19, 2014, 7:25AM), http://www.dailyherald.com/article/20140319/business/140318207/. 
 164.  Id.; see also Charlene Crowell, Mortgage Crisis Continues for Too Many, PHIL. TRIBUNE 
(Apr. 15, 2014, 12:00AM), http://www.phillytrib.com/commentary/mortgage-crisis-continues-for-too-
many/article_5567a480-68d0-53f6-bdca-295c1f7c5dff.html. 
 165.  See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 166.  See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 36. Throughout this Article the terms “property 
preservation firm/contractor,” “property management firm/contractor,” or just “contractor” are used 
interchangeably to mean those companies that comprise the group of businesses who provide services to 
financial institutions in connection with their management of property subject to foreclosure or bank-
owned properties (REO). Id. This industry is collectively known as the Mortgage Field Services 
Industry. See id. 
 167.  Id. 
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behind on his mortgage payments, many times negotiations were 
pending with the mortgage lender or there was a tenant lawfully residing 
on the premises.168  
As 2013 progressed, stories like those of Sherry Eubanks, Barry 
Tatum, and others continued to surface in the news media.169  To date, 
lawsuits have been filed against property management firms who were 
acting on behalf of foreclosing lenders in roughly thirty states.170  And 
so, only a little over a year and a half since the February 2012 national 
mortgage settlement, the same types of foreclosure abuses—albeit in a 
different form and through different players—have again taken hold in 
the housing market.171  This time, however, it is not merely the banks or 
mortgage servicers—as in the case of robosigning—that are engaging in 
wrongful foreclosure practices.172  Rather, foreclosure abuse has a new 
face—the large group of bank-engaged property contractors known as 
the mortgage field services industry.173 To make matters worse, included 
among those banks that have engaged these aggressive third party 
property management firms are the same mortgage giants who are 
parties to the national mortgage settlement.174 
A. The Lender-Property Management Firm Structure 
The relationship between mortgage lenders/servicers and these third 
party contractors is rife with incentives for abuse.  In theory, the 
arrangement is typical of the many situations in which a contractor or 
third party vendor is hired to perform a task that the principal does not 
wish or is not equipped to carryout.175  However, the nuances of the law 
governing foreclosures—which vary state by state—and the recent 
history of out-right abuse and fraud provides an overlay to these 
 168.  Yeager, supra note 36; Rossen & Patel, supra note 36.  
 169.  Yeager, supra note 36; Rossen & Patel, supra note 36. 
 170.  See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 36. 
 171.  See generally id. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Ben Hallman, Banks Keep Breaking Into Houses, and Homeowners Are Fighting Back, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 3, 2013, 11:58AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/02/bank-
contractor-lawsuits-safeguard_n_3975574.html. 
 174.  Id. (“It's also unclear how much legal liability the banks that hire companies like Safeguard 
have for such alleged abuses. In the past, banks have tried to shunt liability onto the contracting 
companies. But the $25 billion settlement struck with state attorney generals last year requires that five 
of the largest banks ‘perform appropriate due diligence’ in examining any third-party contractors’ 
‘expertise, complaints and qualifications.’ Failure to do so could hypothetically lead to fines or other 
penalties. No public actions have been taken yet.”). 
 175.  See generally Complaint, The People of the State of Ill. V. Safeguard Properties, L.L.C., No. 
2013-CH-20175, 2013 WL 5290237 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 9, 2013). 
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relationships that cannot be ignored.176  
1. The Purpose of Property Management Companies in 
Foreclosures 
As the housing crisis resulted in a massive number of home loans 
going into default, banks were confronted with a new and unfamiliar 
volume of properties for which foreclosure was a necessity.177  While 
banks certainly had past experience with how to handle the foreclosure 
of mortgaged properties, the sheer volume during the height of the crisis 
was staggering.178  In fact, it was through this desperation and sense of 
exasperation that many large banks turned to robosigning and other 
questionable practices in order to expedite the process.179 
And even after the height of the crisis had passed and foreclosure 
rates started to decline, lenders still had to deal with the tremendous 
backlog of homes awaiting foreclosure or those properties that because 
of their substantially decreased values could not successfully be sold at a 
foreclosure sale at all.180  Over time lenders began to increasingly 
engage third party contractors—the mortgage field services industry—to 
assist them in managing these foreclosed or about-to-be foreclosed 
properties on the bank’s behalf.181  These firms—with supposed 
expertise in the management and preservation of real estate—would take 
charge of a large swathe of distressed properties to ensure, both post-
default/pre-foreclosure and post-foreclosure, that the property was 
preserved and maintained.182  Contractors might visit the properties as 
often as once a month or more to make sure that there was no damage, 
deterioration, or vandalism during the foreclosure period.183  
Interestingly, however, the actual labor and work performed under 
these agreements are not generally untaken by the property preservation 
firm itself.184  Rather, the firm hires additional third party subcontractors 
who are allocated various portions of the job.185  The most well-known, 
or perhaps, notorious, of these property preservation firms is Safeguard 
Properties, which has been the subject of most of the litigation involving 
 176.  See generally id. 
 177.  See generally id. 
 178.  See generally id. 
 179.  See Mosson, supra note 9. 
 180.  See generally Complaint, Safeguard, No. 2013-CH-20175, 2013 WL 5290237. 
 181.  Id.; see also Silver-Greenberg, supra note 36.  
 182.  Silver-Greenberg, supra note 36. 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id. 
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these alleged practices.186 
2. Terms and Conditions in Property Preservation Contracts 
The contractual agreements entered into between mortgage servicing 
institutions and these third party property preservation firms, by their 
very terms, tempt the contractor to dance at the edges of what is legal or 
allowed.187  In general, what banks most feared during the height of the 
foreclosure crisis (and still do) were those situations whereby the 
defaulting homeowner would walk away from the property and leave it 
abandoned to the elements or to criminal activity.188  In doing so, the 
collateral could be greatly damaged and subsequently decline in value 
significantly.189  
In that vein, these property management firms were charged with 
traveling to the mortgaged property in question, inspecting the premises 
from the street without entering on to the property—which was, legally 
speaking, still owned by the borrower—and determining whether the 
property was still occupied or if it had been abandoned by the distressed 
homeowner.190  If it was determined that the property was abandoned, 
then the firm (or its subcontractor) would “secure the property by 
boarding up the doorway, turning off the water and winterizing the 
home, and placing lockboxes or padlocks on the door.”191  These acts of 
preservation sometimes even involved removing personal property and 
other effects from the home.192  Further, these periodic inspections and 
services often continued “throughout the foreclosure process and after 
the mortgage lender purchase[d] the property in the foreclosure 
auction.”193  
A review of some of the typical provisions contained in property 
preservation contracts between property management firms and their 
subcontractors are instructive of the overall environment that exists in 
these multi-party structures.  In one form agreement the subcontractor 
represents to the firm that it has the required “skills, ability, knowledge, 
experience, and qualifications” to provide the contracted for services.194  
 186.  See Yeager, supra note 36. 
 187.  Complaint, Safeguard, No. 2013-CH-20175, 2013 WL 5290237. 
 188.  See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 36. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Hallman, supra note 173. 
 191.  Complaint, Safeguard, No. 2013-CH-20175, 2013 WL 5290237, at ¶34. 
 192.  Id. at ¶51. 
 193.  Id. at ¶35. 
 194.  REPORESPONSE, INC., VENDOR CONTRACT AND MASTER AGREEMENT FOR REPORESPONSE, 
INC. § 1 (J2011), available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/86439143/Property-Preservation-Service-
Contract [hereinafter REPO PROPERTY PRESERVATION CONTRACT]. 
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Further, the services are represented as being provided in a “thorough, 
accurate, timely, professional, and workmanlike manner.”195  However, 
nothing in the agreement indicates that the vendor is actually verifying 
or providing any follow-up diligence as to whether these representations 
or warranties are fulfilled or have a history of being fulfilled by the 
subcontractor in similar prior transactions.196   
Additionally, the agreement provides that the subcontractor will 
comply with all applicable regulatory guidelines, such as those 
promulgated through Fannie Mae, HUD, or other applicable 
governmental entities; however, the contract further states that there 
may be times when the firm may require that the subcontractor act in 
such a way as to depart from the norms under one or more of these 
guidelines.197  In such cases, the vendor is to notify the subcontractor as 
such and the contractor in prompted to perform the services anyway.198  
If the subcontractor believes it is violating the law by performing the 
services, it must notify the institution and provide accompanying 
reasoning (including a citation to the applicable law).199  By the very 
language of these provisions it is anticipated that the subcontractor may 
be asked to engage in activities that are outside the legal parameters of 
what is permissible.200  And, the burden is placed on the subcontractor 
to not only know the intricacies of the law, but also to be specific—
almost in a lawyer-like way—when refusing to comply by virtue of an 
illegality.201   
Another particularly nebulous and ill-defined provision states that if 
the subcontractor makes a home inspection it must “visually inspect the 
properties so specified . . . to determine the occupancy status and 
physical condition of such properties” and then further instructions will 
be given as to whether the inspection should consist of the interior as 
well as the exterior.202  Of course, since it is under the authority of the 
mortgage servicer that the firm, and in turn the subcontractor, is acting, 
it would seem that guidelines and precautionary protocols would be 
provided by the mortgage institution itself to aid in making those 
determinations. 
The contract also states that if the subcontractor is uncertain as to 
whether the dwelling is occupied, it should contact the firm for further 
 195.  Id. § 2. 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  Id. § 2.1. 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  Id. § 2.2. 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Id. § 2.5. 
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instructions.203  However, in one prominent suit against the well-known 
property management firm Safeguard, it is alleged that the actual fee 
schedule for how these subcontractors are paid is based on how many 
homes are inspected204 and that subcontractors are, at least indirectly, 
encouraged to be swift in making occupancy determinations.205  Also, 
the contract is noticeably absent of guidelines to advise subcontractors 
as to how these occupancy determinations should be made.206  
In another firm’s contract, once the subcontractor determines that the 
dwelling is not occupied, although the subcontractor may not “kick in 
door[s], break door handles or force entry” he is nonetheless required to 
enter the home and if “locked, look for windows or sliding patio doors 
that are not secure and may be opened to permit entry.”207  So while the 
agreement pays lip service to protecting the owner’s property, in the 
same sentence it indirectly suggests that unauthorized entry is still 
permissible.208  Although one should not break down the front door, a 
sliding glass patio or window that is “not secure” (i.e., easily forced 
open) can provide an approved point of access.209  Thus, while the 
prohibitions on breaking-in would seem geared toward protecting the 
rights of the homeowner, the additional language appears to give the 
silent nod to behavior of a more aggressive nature.210 
 203.  Id. § 2.6.1. 
 204.  Complaint at ¶30, The People of the State of Ill. V. Safeguard Properties, L.L.C., No. 2013-
CH-20175, 2013 WL 5290237, at *5 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 9, 2013); see also ZION RESTORATIONS, 
PRESERVATION MANUAL AND CONTRACTOR AGREEMENT (2013), available at 
http://www.zion1.org/resources/Preservation+Manual+and+Contractor+Agreement.pdf [hereinafter 
ZION PROPERTY PRESERVATION AGREEMENT]  (“Bonuses will be paid on a case by case basis based on 
the travel requirements, turn time, and number of assignments completed by Sub-Contractor. All 
bonuses will be awarded by the Field Services Manager and must be approved prior to your acceptance 
of the assignment.”) (emphasis added); Id. (“Some assignments, such as initials, property condition 
reports, rush inspections, or securitizations will require 1–2 days turnaround time, or as stated in the 
work order. Other work, such as scheduled routines are due in 8–12 days. All specific instructions will 
be made clear to you and if an early or rush turn time is required it will be noted on the work order. It is 
critical that you keep ZION informed of any circumstances that may cause delays. Assignments not 
completed by the due date will affect your Sub-Contractor rating and may result in fewer assigned work 
orders.”) (emphasis added). 
 205.  Complaint at ¶45, Safeguard, No. 2013-CH-20175, 2013 WL 5290237, at *5. 
 206.  Id. at ¶44, 49 (“Safeguard or its subcontractors often deem property to be vacant despite 
clear signs that the property is not vacant, such as a barking dog inside the home, a car in the driveway, 
garbage cans placed outside for pickup, a neighbor's statement that the property is occupied or even the 
actual presence of a legal occupant in the home when the subcontractors arrive at the: property.”). 
 207.  See ZION PROPERTY PRESERVATION AGREEMENT, supra note 204, at 14. 
 208.  Id. 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  Id. 
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3. Determinations of Abandonment and Acts of Preservation 
Interestingly, the ability of mortgage servicers and their third party 
contractors to enter onto mortgaged property for the purposes of 
conducting acts of preservation is not unusual or without some 
authority.211  In fact it is rare, if not impossible, to find a residential or 
commercial mortgage instrument today that does not include what is 
known as a property preservation clause.212  These clauses are typically 
broad and far-reaching and stipulate that if the homeowner intentionally 
or through his negligence allows the mortgaged property to be damaged 
or subjected to deterioration, then the mortgagee or its agent has the 
authority to enter onto the premises.213  For instance, the Fannie 
Mae/Freddie Mac uniform single-family residential mortgage includes 
the following provisions: 
7. Borrower’s Obligations to Maintain And Protect 
The Property And to Fulfill Any Lease Obligations.   
(a) Maintenance and Protection of the Property.  I will 
not destroy, damage or harm the Property, and I will not allow the 
Property to deteriorate.  Whether or not I am residing in the 
Property, I will keep the Property in good repair so that it will not 
deteriorate or decrease in value due to its condition.  Unless it is 
determined under Section 5 of this Security Instrument that repair 
is not economically feasible, I will promptly repair the Property if 
damaged to avoid further deterioration or damage . . .  
(b) Lender’s Inspection of Property.  Lender, and 
others authorized by Lender, may enter on and inspect the 
Property.  They will do so in a reasonable manner and at 
reasonable times.  If it has a reasonable purpose, Lender may 
inspect the inside of the home or other improvements on the 
Property.  Before or at the time an inspection is made, Lender will 
give me notice stating a reasonable purpose for such interior 
inspection . . .   
9. Lender’s Right to Protect Its Rights in The 
Property.  If:  (a) I do not keep my promises and agreements made 
in this Security Instrument; . . . or (c) I have abandoned the 
Property, then Lender may do and pay for whatever is reasonable 
or appropriate to protect Lender’s interest in the Property and 
Lender’s rights under this Security Instrument.   
 211.  See, e.g., Security Instruments, FREDDIE MAC: NEW YORK MORTGAGE: FORM 3033, 
http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/doc/3033-NewYorkMortgage.doc (last visited June 9, 2015). 
 212.  See id. 
 213.  See id. 
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Lender’s actions may include, but are not limited to:  (a) 
protecting and/or assessing the value of the Property; (b) securing 
and/or repairing the Property; . . . Lender can also enter the 
Property to make repairs, change locks, replace or board up doors 
and windows, drain water from pipes, eliminate building or other 
code violations or dangerous conditions, have utilities turned on or 
off, and take any other action to secure the Property.  Although 
Lender may take action under this Section 9, Lender does not have 
to do so and is under no duty to do so.  I agree that Lender will not 
be liable for not taking any or all actions under this Section 9.214  
 Notably, the language above stipulates that the lender’s ability to 
enter the property is limited.  Specifically, the lender may only make a 
reasonable inspection of the property.215  Further, reasonable cause 
must exist in order for the lender to enter the premises and inspect the 
inside, and must be preceded by notice to the owner.216  By providing 
such rights and (at least nominal) accompanying protections, the 
borrower warrants that it will preserve and maintain the property vis-à-
vis the mortgagee, and that the mortgagee, vis-à-vis the homeowner, is 
allowed to preserve the property in the event the homeowner fails to do 
so.217  On the surface, it would seem that if all parties act in accordance 
with the spirit of the agreement, then nothing will go wrong and the 
rights of both will be respected and preserved.218  
B. Abusive and Fraudulent Practices by Property Management 
Firms 
But, unfortunately, quite a bit went wrong with these arrangements.219  
Instead of following the parameters and safeguards for how the lender 
should engage in acts of preservation, allegations abound that mortgage 
servicers, through third party vendors, undertook a much more 
aggressive and, in many cases, unauthorized approach to dealing with 
foreclosed properties.220  In many of the reports the determination of 
 214.  Id. § 7, 9 (emphasis added). Each of the various template mortgages for each of the states 
listed contains an identical clause which allows the mortgagee to, essentially, assume some level of 
control and dominion over the mortgaged property in the event the mortgagee makes a determination 
that the property is being damaged or allowed to deteriorate. However, it is notable that the mortgagee is 
the one who determines what is reasonable, both in terms of the entry process and in terms of the 
reasons for cause. 
 215.  Id. 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  Id. 
 218.  See id. 
 219.  See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 36; see also Yeager, supra note 36. 
 220.  Rossen & Patel, supra note 36; Morran, supra note 36. 
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occupancy was a mere pretext for intimidating the homeowner and 
chasing him off the property, not to mention the destruction of personal 
property and the shame and feelings of violation that occur when one’s 
home is broken into.221 
1. Defaulted Homeowners as Victims 
In one report out of Tampa, Florida, homeowner Deanna Tedone 
alleged that she returned to her home at the end of the day only to find 
that a contractor, sent by her mortgagee U.S. Bank, was smashing holes 
in the walls of her house.222  His purported reason was that he was 
inspecting the mortgaged property for Chinese-drywall, all in an effort 
by U.S. Bank to protect its collateral.223  Although Tedone had indeed 
fallen behind on her mortgage payments, neither U.S. Bank nor its 
contractor contacted the homeowner prior to the visit to alert her to this 
invasive inspection.224  The so-called inspection left debris and rubble 
scattered about the home, thereby diminishing Tedone’s ability to sell 
the property at a short sale and thereby avoid damaging her ability to 
obtain loans and other forms of credit in the future.225 
In another account, Majorie Principe of Illinois claimed that she 
returned home one day to find that her bank’s contractor had “taken her 
furniture, books, savings bonds, and electronics.”226  Another 
homeowner who had defaulted on his loan out of Cleveland, Ohio, 
purports to have been deprived of his clothing by a property 
preservation sweep, and an Atlanta man was actually arrested when he 
tried to “force his way back into his home after a Safeguard contractor 
locked him out.”227  In the end, it was discovered that the worker had 
actually gone to the wrong house.228   
2. Third Party Possessors as Victims 
Furthermore, homeowners are not the only casualties of these 
practices; rather, tenants of homeowners who have defaulted on their 
mortgage payments have also been victims.  For instance, Nicole Corum 
of Independence, Missouri, stated that she returned to her rented 
 221.  See generally Hallman, supra note 173. 
 222.  Id. 
 223.  See id. 
 224.  Id. 
 225.  See id. 
 226.  Id. 
 227.  Id. 
 228.  Id. 
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home—for which she was current on all rental obligations—to find that 
all of her belongings were missing, including her 7-year old son’s toys, 
and the premises was left greatly damaged.229  Neighbors reported 
seeing a man emptying the house earlier in the day and, when 
confronted, answered that he had “an order. I work for Safeguard, deal 
with them.”230  Upon calling Safeguard, Corum states that she was told 
that all her belongings were “out in the dump” and that Safeguard was 
not in the business of keeping things in storage which were the subject 
of a property preservation order.231 
The possibility for even more episodes like those described above 
endless.  By one account, over three million homes across the country 
are in some form of default or foreclosure proceeding and are subject to 
regular inspections by property management firms.232  
C. Private and State Litigation 
Over the past several years since the outbreak of the housing 
foreclosure crisis over two hundred fifty lawsuits have been filed against 
various property preservation firms, and these cases span across thirty-
one states.233  Moreover, the height of these abuses appears to be rather 
recent, since the majority of the two hundred fifty lawsuits were initiated 
within only the latter part of 2012 and throughout 2013.234  
However, despite such tragedies these lawsuits have been met with 
differing levels of success. Although the stories are all similar—tales of 
homeowners, behind on their payments and often still in negotiations 
with the mortgagee, experiencing varying levels of aggressive and 
intimidating behavior by third party property management companies 
hired by the mortgagee to perform certain inspection and securitization 
services—and even the pleadings bear a striking resemblance to one 
another, the results often are mixed and inconsistent. 
An overview of some of the cases in which plaintiffs have 
successfully obtained judgments against the mortgagee, the property 
 229.  See Yeager, supra note 36. 
 230.  Id. 
 231.  Id. Ms. Corum and two other families who experienced similar treatment at the hands of this 
bank contractor have filed suit against Safeguard. See id. The attorney representing the plaintiffs stated 
“Imagine having your family heirlooms, things that you may have been given from a grandparent, 
something that you hold dear, something you want to hand down to your children or whatever and all of 
a sudden one day all of that is snatched from you.” Id. 
 232.  See Hallman, supra note 173 (citing a report by the online real estate enterprise RealtyTrac). 
 233.  Id. Although many of the suits have occurred during the past two years, some of the earliest 
break-in style foreclosures occurred as far back as 2010. See Andrew Martin, In a Sign of Foreclosure 
Flaws, Suits Claim Break-Ins by Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2010, at A1. 
 234.  See Hallman, supra note 173. 
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management firm, subcontractors, or any combination thereof, helps 
ferret out the attitude of courts with regard to these types of abuses, as 
well as reveals those areas of the law that have the potential to provide a 
just remedy and which do not.  In almost all cases instituted on the basis 
of these break-in foreclosures the requested relief arises from the same 
set of legal theories—invasion of privacy, conversion, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, negligence, breach of contract, 
sometimes state consumer protection laws, and all in combination with 
agency theories in order to impute liability up the chain to the mortgage 
servicer.  However, there is no uniformity as to whether any single or 
combination of theories leads to a victory for the distressed homeowner.  
In the Main Supreme Judicial Court case of Lougee Conservancy v. 
Citimortgage, Inc. et al, the beneficiaries of a trust that held title to land 
and a residence located thereon, filled with family heirlooms, sued 
CitiMortgage and its property preservation contractor and subcontractor 
for breaking into the home and damaging property.235  In fact, it was not 
the trust property, but rather another parcel some several miles away that 
was actually the subject of the default to CitiMortgage.236  It was only 
through the error of Safeguard and its subcontractor that the inspector 
erroneously arrived at the trust property in the first place.237  
When the subcontractor first arrived at the trust property he was 
unsure as to whether this was the right location, but later concluded 
based on conversations with Safeguard that this was indeed the 
mortgaged property.238  Despite the presence of a number of “no 
trespassing” signs posted around the trust property, the inspector gained 
entry to the residence and “emptied shelves and cupboards and moved 
items around.”239  It was also alleged by the plaintiffs that the 
subcontractor “damaged a door, a doorframe, and an antique desk that 
belonged to Maine’s first governor.”240  Before leaving, the 
subcontractor placed a lockbox on the door and placed a board across 
the entryway.241 The plaintiffs returned to the property thereafter and, 
after a short period of time, were able to gain reentry into the home and 
assess the break-in.242 
The plaintiffs brought a host of actions, mostly all based in tort, 
 235.  48 A.3d 774 (Me. 2012). 
 236.  Id. at 778. 
 237.  Id. 
 238.  Id. 
 239.  See id. 
 240.  Id. 
 241.  Id. 
 242.  See id. at 779. 
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against all the parties involved.243  As to the issue of whether the acts of 
the subcontractor could be imputed to Safeguard and subsequently up 
the chain to CitiMortgage, the court held that even though the 
relationship between the parties was styled as that of independent 
contractors, the hiring agent could still be held liable under agency law 
“if the principal controls the contractor’s performance, thereby making 
the contractor an agent of the principal.”244  The court went on to find 
that, under the master services agreement between CitiMortgage and 
Safeguard, the mortgagee alone was authorized under the mortgage 
preservation clause to entry the property.245  Therefore, the authority of 
Safeguard and any of its subcontractors to do the same was solely 
derived from the power and authority granted by contract to 
CitiMortgage.246  Further, the mortgagee exercised a certain level of 
control over the contractor by way of a scorecard system that monitored 
and rated the work performed.247  Thus, there were enough facts that 
could substantiate holding CitiMortgage liable for the acts of its agent, 
Safeguard, and thereby for the acts of Safeguard’s subcontractor also.248   
In analyzing the action for relief under invasion of privacy, the court 
held that despite the defenses raised by the defendants it was not 
necessary for the plaintiffs to actually “occupy” the premises in order to 
bring the claim.249  Rather, their equitable title by virtue of their 
beneficiary status under the land trust was enough to give them a legally 
protected property interest.250  “An individual is not required to own or 
live on the premises to be considered its ‘occupant’ or to maintain an 
expectation of privacy within its walls.”251  However, the court 
concluded that the subcontractor did not actually intend that his entry 
onto the premises result in the invasion of the plaintiffs “solitude or 
seclusion.”252  Rather, he was there to secure and winterize the premises 
and the disruption of the privacy of the trust beneficiaries was only 
 243.  Id. 
 244.  Id. at 780 (citing Baker Bus Serv., Inc. v. Keith, 416 A.2d 727, 730–31 n.2 (Me.1980); State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Koshy, 995 A.2d 651 (Me. 2010)). 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  Id. at 781 (“The mortgage states that if the mortgagee abandons the property, ‘Lender may 
do and pay for whatever is necessary to protect the value of the Property and the Lender's right in the 
Property,’ which specifically includes securing the property. The Master Services Agreement describes 
specific tasks that Safeguard or its subcontractors must perform, and CitiMortgage supervises 
Safeguard's work and the quality of its work through a ‘Score Cards’ system, work updates, and 
memos.”) (emphasis added). 
 247.  Id. 
 248.  See id. 
 249.  See id. 
 250.  Id. 
 251.  See id. at 782. 
 252.  Id. 
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incidental thereto.253  
With respect to the claim of conversion, the court stated that the 
plaintiffs must prove that their property rights were “seriously interfered 
with.”254  And since the plaintiffs were able “to gain entry to the 
Homestead within a matter of hours” a claim for conversion could not 
be sustained since the duration of exclusion was so brief.255  Lastly, the 
court refused to uphold the plaintiffs’ claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress as well.256  Although they both experienced “general 
feelings of upset and defeat” these were not “substantial enough to 
qualify as emotional distress.”257 
And lastly, with respect to the negligence claim, the court held that 
CitiMortgage, Safeguard, and the subcontractor all owed a duty to the 
plaintiffs to “act with care when identifying and securing mortgaged 
property in order to avoid securing or damaging property that they have 
no legal right to enter.”258  In this case, the court stated, a prima facie 
case was established that a breach of such a duty had occurred.259 
In a similar case, an Illinois federal court held partially for the 
plaintiffs on the basis of many of the same claims as those at issue in 
Lougee Convervancy.260  In Jackson v. Bank of New York, the plaintiff 
filed suit against the Bank of New York, Litton Loan Servicing, LP, the 
bank’s loan servicer, Safeguard, Litton’s contractor, and a host of 
subcontractors also engaged for the purposes of foreclosure-related 
activities.261  The facts which preceded the suit were as follows: after an 
alleged default, Litton instructed Safeguard to travel to the property 
where it proceeded to change the locks, winterize the house, and remove 
personal property belonging to the owner, “all without prior notice or 
judicial authorization.”262  
As to the issue of agency, the court held that there appeared to be 
enough allegations to at least establish a prima facie case for an agency 
relationship between Bank of New York and Litton, and between Litton 
and Safeguard.263  This was based on the fact that Bank of New York 
was the holder of the mortgage and the plaintiff worked with the bank, 
through Litton, in his attempts to modify the mortgage which, when 
 253.  See id. 
 254.  Id. at 783. 
 255.  See id.; see also id. at 779. 
 256.  Id. at 784. 
 257.  See id. 
 258.  Id. at 785. 
 259.  Id. 
 260.  Jackson v. Bank of N.Y., No. 11-CV-6410, 2012 WL 2503956 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 2012). 
 261.  Id. at *1. 
 262.  Id. 
 263.  Id. at *2. 
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those attempts did not come to a resolution, resulted in Safeguard being 
sent to conduct post-default/pre-foreclosure activities relative to the 
property.264  The court also held in favor of the plaintiff in stating that he 
had made out a valid claim for trespass due to the defendants “intrusion 
on to the plaintiff’s interest in exclusive possession of the land.”265  The 
court also found that the plaintiff should prevail, based on the lack of 
evidence to the contrary, on the claim that the defendants had also 
effected conversion of the plaintiff’s personal possessions when the 
items were removed by the subcontractor and not returned after 
demand.266  Further, the court upheld the plaintiff’s claim for invasion of 
privacy because the defendants had entered into his home, unauthorized, 
where he kept his private information and personal documents.267 
However, the court struck down the claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress on the basis that, although offensive to the plaintiff, 
the winterization of the house and the damage to the personal property 
was not outrageous conduct within the meaning of the tort.268  Also, the 
court refused to uphold the claim for negligence because title to the 
home was held in the name of the plaintiff’s wife and the lack of a 
contractual relationship with the plaintiff precluded recovery under the 
negligence analysis.269  As a final example, the bankruptcy court in In re 
Carpenter upheld claims for invasion of privacy in stating that “a person 
of ordinary sensibilities could have been highly offended, shamed, 
humiliated or suffered emotionally from having her residence entered 
unlawfully and all the contents thereof, including those of the most 
private nature, removed without her knowledge or consent” but was 
unwilling to validate the other accompanying claims for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and trespass.270  
Various other courts have allowed, at least in part, some form of 
recovery to plaintiffs who have suffered the destruction of personal 
property and the invasion of home and personal integrity at the hands of 
unscrupulous contractors.271  In Gordon v. Bank of New York Mellon 
Corp. the distressed and defaulted homeowner returned home to find 
that “all of the doors in the house were damaged, and the inside of the 
house was trashed. . . . Most of plaintiffs’ personal property was gone, 
and there were signs that the house had been winterized by a 
 264.  Id. at *2. 
 265.  Id. at *3. 
 266.  Id. 
 267.  Id. at *5. 
 268.  Id. at *4. 
 269.  See id. at *3–4. 
 270.  No. 11-20896-TPA, 2013 WL 1953275, at *15 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. May 7, 2013). 
 271.  See, e.g., Hodges v. U.S. Bank Home Mortgage, No. 10-C-5928, 2011 WL 211343 (N.D. Ill. 
Jan. 20, 2011). 
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contractor.”272  The court upheld the plaintiffs claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and stated that, although the parties 
failed to plead the proper authority for their positions, the court reasoned 
that the defendant “knew that severe emotional distress was “certain, or 
substantially certain, to result from [its] conduct.”’273  
The cases above illustrate that while few litigants prevail on all cause 
of actions, a number of courts are at least willing to provide some 
avenue of recourse—however limited it might be.  But by the same 
token many other courts have also shown an unwillingness to impose 
any form of liability, or at least any substantial liability, on financial 
institutions and/or their contractors when confronted with break-in 
forecloses lawsuits.  These cases range from those where the court finds 
that the parties have failed to allege the necessary facts to meet the 
elements needed for relief274 or the courts themselves evidence hostility 
toward the defaulted homeowner and are unwilling to make the 
mortgagee or its agents out to be the villain.  
In the 2013 decision of Kheder v. Seterus, Inc., the Michigan appeals 
court used the property preservation clause in the plaintiff’s mortgage as 
a shield to protect the mortgagee and the contractor from most all 
allegations of wrongdoing.275  The court dismissed the claim for 
conversion, stating that the destruction of the locks, the water meters, 
and the door all comprised damage to fixtures which, as a part of real 
estate, were precluded from recovery under conversion.276  The claim 
for trespass met a similar fate as the court noted that the owner had 
consented to such entry pursuant to the clause in the mortgage: “Keller 
Williams’s actions were reasonable and appropriate to protect the 
lender’s interest and were, therefore, authorized by plaintiffs.”277  
In Robison v. Litton Loan Servicing, L.P., the mortgagee’s contractor 
entered the plaintiff’s home with instructions to winterize the 
property.278  The plaintiff arrived home later that day only to find that it 
“was sealed shut and the locks changed.”279  Further, the homeowner 
alleged that when she did gain access to the property she discovered that 
“locks had been broken, the home was uninhabitable, and several items 
were missing.”280  The court, in reviewing the same types of causes of 
 272.  964 F. Supp. 2d 937, 940 (N.D. Ind. 2013). 
 273.  Id. at 947. 
 274.  See, e.g., Coble v. Suntrust Mortgage Inc., No. C13-1878-JCC, 2014 WL 631206 (W.D. 
Wash. Feb. 18, 2014). 
 275.  No. 308227, 2013 WL 1286020, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2013). 
 276.  See id. at *4. 
 277.  Id. at *5. 
 278.  No. 09-CV-02677-WYD-MJW, 2011 WL 1135369, at *1 (D. Col. Mar. 29, 2011). 
 279.  Id. 
 280.  Id. 
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action as articulated in each of the break-in foreclosure cases described 
above, held that the emotional distress claim was unmerited since the 
winterization of the home was not “outrageous conduct”281 and denied 
the claim that the mortgagee violated its contractual obligation to act in 
good faith because the language of the loan documents specifically 
allowed the mortgagee to act in this manner282—evidently regardless of 
how over-reaching such terms might be. 
 As yet another illustration of the importance some courts have placed 
on mortgage preservation clauses, the plaintiff in the 2013 case of 
McCray v. Specialized Loan Servicing was sent notice that she had 
fallen behind on her mortgage payments and thereafter entered into 
negotiations with the bank to begin payments again the following 
month.283  Five days into the succeeding month the bank sent its 
property preservation firm, LPS Field Services, Inc., to inspect the 
plaintiff’s residence and determine whether it was abandoned.284  After a 
finding of vacancy, the contractor made a second visit to the premises 
and proceeded to change the locks, shut off the water meter, winterize 
the home, and allegedly damage the screen and front door.285  Based on 
these actions, the plaintiff filed suit alleging chiefly trespass and 
damages resulting therefrom.286 
In deciding the case, the court held that while trespass on the property 
of another can give rise to liability, by virtue of the property 
preservation clause contained in the deed of trust mortgage and in 
combination with the plaintiff’s default under her loan, the plaintiff was 
deprived of her right to possession.287  The mortgage clause stated that 
the if the “[b]orrower fails to perform the covenants and agreements 
contained in this Security Instrument...the Lender may do and pay for 
whatever is reasonable or appropriate to protect Lender's interest in the 
Property and rights under this Security Instrument. . . .”288  The deed of 
trust further stated that the “[b]orrower shall have possession of the 
Property until Lender has given Borrower notice of default. . . .”289 
 281.  Id. at *7. 
 282.  Id. at *9. 
 283.  No. CIV.A RDB-12-02200, 2013 WL 1316341, at *1 (D. Md. Mar. 28, 2013). 
 284.  Id. at *2. 
 285.  Id. (“At this time the contractor placed a notice on the door of the residence which stated 
‘Notice—LPS Field Services, Inc. inspected this property and found it to be vacant or abandoned. The 
mortgage holder has the right and duty to protect this property accordingly. It is likely that the mortgage 
holder will have the property secured and/or winterized within the next few days.’”).  
 286.  Id. 
 287.  Id. at *5. 
 288.  See id. at *4 (“Securing the Property includes, but is not limited to, entering the Property to 
make repairs, change locks, replace or board up doors and windows, drain water from pipes, eliminate 
building or other code violations or dangerous conditions, and have utilities turned off.”). 
 289.  See id. 
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The court reasoned that since the plaintiff had received notice of 
default she no longer had a legal right of possession in the property 
under the deed of trust.290  And, in fact, it was the mortgagee that now 
had the right to possess the property, which included the “authority to 
inspect, secure and winterize it.  Thus, Plaintiff fail[ed] to state a claim 
of trespass.”291 
Although all of the cases above concern private individuals asserting 
claims against mortgagees and their contractors (and sometimes even 
their subcontractors) based on break-in foreclosures, individual states 
have also become involved in trying to call these actors to task.  On 
September 9, 2013, the Illinois Attorney General filed suit against a 
particularly notorious property preservation firm292 in People of the 
State of Illinois v. Safeguard Properties, LLC based on a series of 
successive break-in-style foreclosure actions spanning across that 
state.293  The attorney general based her public class action-style claims 
on violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act.294 
The state’s petition requests that the court “permanently enjoin[] 
[Safeguard] from engaging in the deceptive and unfair acts and 
practices . . . including a permanent injunction barring [it] from 
engaging in the business of advertising, soliciting, offering for sale, and 
selling property management and preservation services . . . in the State 
of Illinois.”295  This was in addition to requesting civil penalties in the 
amount of $50,000, another $50,000 penalty for each consumer fraud 
violation, and a final $10,000 penalty for each consumer fraud violation 
“found to have been committed against a person 65 years of age or 
older.”296 
Like the language of many other state consumer fraud statutes, the 
Illinois act addresses deceptive practices as including:  
 290.  Id. at *5. 
 291.  Id. 
 292.  See generally Complaint, The People of the State of Ill. V. Safeguard Properties, L.L.C., No. 
2013-CH-20175, 2013 WL 5290237 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 9, 2013) (The company’s website states that 
“Safeguard is a turnkey resource for all aspects of default property management. Through continuous 
training of internal staff and local contractors, Safeguard ensures that all work performed meets 
investor/insurer requirements and agreed-upon timeframes, in the most cost-effective manner, to help 
save money and prevent curtailment penalties. We offer a full spectrum of inspection, preservation, 
valuations, and title services. As an industry leader, we pride ourselves on our attention to detail, our 
quick turnaround times, and our high levels of quality service in the field and in our corporate office.”). 
Id. at ¶26. 
 293.  See generally Complaint, Safeguard, No. 2013-CH-20175, 2013 WL 5290237. 
 294.  Id. at ¶¶ 6–7 (“The Illinois Attorney General believes this action to be in the public interest 
of the citizens of the State of Illinois and brings this lawsuit pursuant to the Illinois Consumer Fraud 
Act.”). 
 295.  Id. 
 296.  Id. 
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Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices, including but not limited to the use or employment of 
any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, 
misrepresentation or the concealment, suppression or omission of 
any material fact, with intent that others rely upon the 
concealment, suppression or omission of such material fact, or the 
use or employment of any practice . . . in the conduct of any trade 
or commerce are hereby declared unlawful whether any person has 
in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby.297 
The petition goes on to specifically enumerate those acts, committed 
by Safeguard under the direction of the applicable mortgage servicer, 
which constituted an unfair or deceptive trade practice.298  These include 
representing to homeowners that they no longer have a right to occupy 
their homes, as well as engaging in acts of intimidation in order to entice 
legal possessors to vacate the premises.299  
The petition further alleges that the property preservation firm took 
unlawful possession of mortgaged property, including through acts of 
breaking and entering legally occupied homes, and thereafter changing 
locks, depriving owners of access, and turning off utilities.300  Lastly, it 
is alleged that the defendant unlawfully removed the personal property 
of many homeowners, all the while without proper judicial authority, 
and failed to train, hire, and supervise its subcontractors who engaged in 
these activities on its behalf.301 
In response to the lawsuit, Safeguard’s chief executive officer 
released a statement to all of the company’s clients, which included 
various mortgagees and mortgage servicers, defending the embattled 
company’s position.302  The contractor stated that it adhered to a 
“rigorous procedure of checks and balances to verify occupancy prior to 
securing a vacant property.”303  As to allegations of poor hiring or 
supervision, Safeguard stated that it conducts “background checks of all 
contractors and crews, carefully monitor[s] the performance of 
inspectors, and take[s] immediate corrective action if policies are 
violated.”304  As of this writing the case is still pending in Illinois state 
 297.  Id. (citing Section 2 of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2). 
 298.  See id. 
 299.  Id. 
 300.  See id. 
 301.  See id. 
 302.  Safeguard Client Communication in Response to Illinois Attorney General's Lawsuit, 
TODAY NEWS (Oct. 1, 2013, 8:05PM), http://www.today.com/news/safeguard-client-communication-
response-illinois-attorney-generals-lawsuit-8C11311715. 
 303.  See id. 
 304.  Id. 
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court and, although no other states have yet to take any similar action, 
the Ohio Attorney General has reported a number of complaints relative 
to break-in foreclosure practices in the latter part of 2013.305   
IV. LIABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY: AN APPRAISAL OF BREAK-IN 
FORECLOSURES 
Despite the far-reaching and substantial damage caused by the 
housing crisis and the accompanying public backlash against the 
financial institutions that brought it about, overreaching foreclosure 
practices still persist.306  Despite the $25 billion settlement with the 
nation’s largest banks on account of robosigning and other wrongful 
mortgage practices, meaningful oversight of bank foreclosures is still 
lacking.307  And despite the expenditure of billions of American tax 
dollars to help stabilize the financial sector, the instability of which was 
caused by the creation and trading of toxic housing-related instruments, 
break-in foreclosures have nevertheless emerged and spread across the 
country.308 
Reacting to these abuses, in March of 2014 the inspector general of 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development issued a report that 
sharply criticized the lack of government oversight in connection with 
the use of third party property management firms by mortgage 
servicers.309  “Overall, several servicers reviewed during the audit did 
not have quality controls in place to ensure contractors provided 
accurate, complete, and consistent information in property inspection 
reports.”310  The report further stated that many of the audited inspection 
reports revealed “inconsistent and inaccurate information; missing or 
blurry photographs; manipulated date and time stamps on the 
photographs; and unnecessary inspections that did not provide useful 
information about the properties.”311  And lastly, the report found that 
“[t]he pre-foreclosure property inspection industry is largely 
unregulated” and further stated that “there are no specific federal or state 
laws that govern property inspections of homes securing mortgage loans 
 305.   Michelle Jarboe McFee, Safeguard Properties of Valley View Sued by Illinois Attorney 
General Over Treatment of Foreclosures, CLEVELAND.COM (Sept. 12, 2013), 
http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2013/09/safeguard_properties_of_valley.html. 
 306.  See supra Parts I–II. 
 307.  See supra Parts I–II and accompanying discussion.  
 308.  See supra Parts I–II. 
 309.  See FED. HOUSING FIN. AGENCY, AUDIT REPORT: FHFA OVERSIGHT ENTERPRISE 
CONTROLS OVER PRE-FORECLOSURE PROPERTY INSPECTIONS (2014), available at 
https://origin.www.fhfaoig.gov/Content/Files/AUD-2014-012.pdf. 
 310.  Id. at 1. 
 311.  Id. at 1–2. 
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in default” which includes a lack of standards for servicers “to require 
their inspectors to maintain minimum education requirements, 
experience level, or qualifications.”312  
However, in response to this torrent of criticisms and critiques from 
the federal housing watchdog agency, the actual Department of Housing 
and Urban Development, through the Federal Housing Finance Agency, 
stated that it would direct the GSEs to “assess and manage risks related 
to property inspections” but declared that “The [housing agency] does 
not believe the report findings and examples of deficiencies provide 
compelling support for the imposition of uniform standards.”313 
A. Critique of Existing Laws and Regulations 
As evidenced above, the laws, regulations, and other legal 
frameworks currently in place to deal with foreclosure abuses of this 
kind have proved inadequate.314  Despite findings of poor controls and a 
lack of regulation to ensure quality and adherence to the law, the federal 
agencies charged with monitoring the housing market have been 
unwilling to address the problem.  And while many of the legal 
protections and safeguards that exist under current law—such as under 
tort and contract theories—can sometimes provide recourse for the 
distressed homeowner, these remedies are far from being consistent or 
reliable.315  
Similarly, the provisions of the national mortgage settlement that are 
geared toward ensuring that financial institutions adequately hire and 
supervise their contractors, although well intentioned, have not proved 
effective.316  Understanding the loopholes, inadequacies, and 
deficiencies in these existing laws and regulations reveal, in starker 
terms, the serious and immediate need to adopt a more robust and 
muscular approach to deal with mortgagee-contractor behavior in 
connection with foreclosures.317 
 312.  Id. at 11. 
 313.  See Ben Hallman, Housing Watchdog Slams Massive Property Inspection Industry, 
HUFFINTGON POST (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/25/property-inspection-
industry_n_5029000.html; see also Press Release, Nat’l Assoc. of Mortgage Field Servs., Inc., NAMFS 
Offers an Alternate Perspective on Performance of Pre-Foreclosure Inspections (April 12, 2014), 
available at http://www.namfs.org/Portals/0/2014_04_12_NAMFS_OIG_Audit_Final.pdf  (describing 
the response by the National Association of Mortgage Field Services and that body’s creation of an 
academy to train and certify mortgage field service providers). 
 314.  See supra Part II.C. 
 315.  See id. 
 316.  See id. 
 317.  See id. 
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1. Deficiencies in Settlement Enforcement and Scope 
Part II of the servicing standards portion of the national mortgage 
settlement318 stipulates that mortgage servicers must enact policies to 
supervise and manage “foreclosure firms, law firms, foreclosure 
trustees, subservicers and other agents, independent contractors, entities 
and third parties (including subsidiaries and affiliates)” that are retained 
by the servicer.319  The obvious motivation behind this provision is to 
ensure that, to the extent third party contractors are engaged in assisting 
in the foreclosure of distressed properties, the mortgagee will ensure that 
these parties respect the rights of the borrower and do not engage in any 
fraudulent activities.320  This would include regulating third party 
contractors charged with signing affidavits of proof that the foreclosing 
mortgagee had the proper authority to act (thereby guarding against 
additional robosigning), as well as providing that other foreclosure 
professionals are adequately supervised and credentialed so as to 
prevent violations of state foreclosure laws (including the observance of 
notice, cure, and consumer protection safeguards).321 
And, although probably not in the forefront at the time of the 
settlement, part III of the mortgage servicing standards would also cover 
the activities of those third party property management firms who had 
been and continue to be retained by financial institutions to assist in 
determining the occupancy of foreclosed properties and to guard against 
undue damage to the collateral.322  
Although well intentioned, enforcement of these servicing standards 
is another matter.  In general, enforcement of the national settlement 
agreement is delegated to a monitoring committee comprised of 
representatives from the various plaintiff state attorneys general and 
federal agencies.323  In connection with the monitoring committee an 
individual is appointed as the “monitor” who is charged with the overall 
 318.  The servicing standards constitute an omnibus set of uniform agreements that each of the 
defendants entered into relative to mortgage servicing rules, regulations, and processes. This document 
is appended to each of the consent judgments as Exhibit A. See, e.g., Consent Judgment, U.S. v. Bank of 
America, No. 1:12-cv-00361-RMC (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012), available at 
https://www.jasmithmonitoring.com/omso/wpcontent/uploads/sites/4/2014/05/Consent_Judgment_Chas
e_4.11.122.pdf [hereinafter Chase Consent Judgment]. 
 319.  Id. 
 320.  See supra Part I.A.1–4. 
 321.  See supra Part I.A.1–4. 
 322.  See Chase Consent Judgment, supra note 318; see also supra Part II. 
 323.  See Exhibit E, Chase Consent Judgment, supra note 318, at B (“A committee comprising 
representatives of the state Attorneys General, State Financial Regulators, the U.S. Department of 
Justice, and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development shall monitor Servicer’s 
compliance with this Consent Judgment (the “Monitoring Committee”).”).  
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administration of the settlement.324  This individual is commissioned 
with determining whether the defendant banks are in compliance with 
the servicing standards, as well as their implementation, according to 
individually approved work plans with each of the defendants.325  These 
work plans are subject to quarterly reviews for compliance by yet 
another third party reviewer known as the internal review group.326  This 
second bureaucratic entity is comprised of auditors and compliance 
officers who are not involved in the direct mortgage servicing line of 
business.327  
As to work plan accountability, each servicer is subject to a 
compliance metric that charts goals and assigns values to the mortgage 
servicing standards.328 By periodically assessing the level of compliance 
that each institution has achieved the metric allows the monitor, the 
internal review group, and the defendant to nominally measure, in an 
objective fashion, the extent to which the consent decree is being 
adhered.329  Throughout this process the bank defendants must provide 
information and access to the monitor for purposes of ensuring 
compliance and on-track fulfillment of the work plans.330  
For purposes of this Article, the third party contractor oversight 
provisions of the consent decree are most directly applicable to 
preventing or remediating break-in foreclosure practices.331  This 
benchmark requirement is listed in item 5 of the work plan metric.332  It 
requires that the internal review group and the monitor judge 
compliance by looking at whether there is evidence that the servicer has 
“documented oversight policies and procedures demonstrating 
compliance with vendor oversight provisions,” whether there is 
“evidence of periodic sampling and testing of foreclosure documents,” 
whether there has been a review of “fees and costs assessed by 
vendors,” and whether servicers have implemented scorecards “to 
evaluate vendor performance.”333  
 324.  Id. 
 325.  Id. at E.5 (“Servicer and the Monitor shall reach agreement on the terms of the Work Plan 
within 90 days of the Monitor’s appointment, which time can be extended for good cause by agreement 
of Servicer and the Monitor. If such Work Plan is not objected to by the Monitoring Committee within 
20 days, the Monitor shall proceed to implement the Work Plan.”). 
 326.  Id. at E.3. 
 327.  See id. at E.4. 
 328.  Id. at E.4.7. 
 329.  Id. (“Servicer’s compliance with the Servicing Standards shall be assessed via metrics 
identified and defined in Schedule E-1.”). 
 330.  Id. at E.7. 
 331.  Id. at Exhibit A, Part III. 
 332.  Id. at E.1.8. 
 333.  See id. for a description of the measurements, the loan level tolerance for error, the threshold 
error rate for penalties, and the test population, error definitions, and testing questions. 
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But the obvious question becomes what happens if one of the 
defendant financial institutions violates the terms of the consent decree 
or fails to implement or adhere to the mortgage servicing requirements 
per its work plan?  The enforcement terms that govern the monitor’s 
oversight abilities state that “if the Monitor becomes aware of facts or 
information that lead the Monitor to reasonably conclude that Servicer 
may be engaged in a pattern of noncompliance with a material term of 
the Servicing Standards that is reasonably likely to cause harm to 
borrowers or tenants residing in foreclosed properties” then the monitor 
must engage the servicer in a review of the facts to determine their 
veracity.334  Then, and only then, can the monitor propose additional, 
although limited, metric benchmarks for the servicer to achieve as part 
of its on-going work plan.335  
And it is only after the monitor and the defendants have engaged in 
these good faith attempts to resolve the dispute that either of them may 
return to the federal district court for a resolution, which of course can 
involve a protracted period of delay.336  All the while homeowners such 
as those who have experienced break-in foreclosures may be deprived of 
access to their homes and/or their personal property.337  
Thus, while it might seem that the monitor has substantial authority to 
ensure compliance with the consent decree, in reality this power is far 
more limited and circumscribed.  First, compliance is very standardized 
through the use of the work plan metric and does not leave much room 
for less tangible and unpredictable but still egregious forms of lending 
abuse.  Secondly, the compliance process is subject to the review of 
multiple groups and entities that must all collaborate in order to bring 
down the hammer on a violating servicer.  And third, the monitor’s 
power in connection for when a violation has occurred is relegated to 
adding additional benchmarks to the violator’s work plan, but the 
monitor is limited in how far he can go in making such additions.338 
Perhaps most relevant for those homeowners who have experienced 
break-in foreclosures, only the parties to the consent decree and the 
monitoring committee have the authority to enforce its provisions, and 
enforcement can only occur in the federal district court for the District 
of Columbia.339  Therefore, these remedies provide no meaningful 
 334.  See id. at E.8. 
 335.  For the limitations on the monitor’s ability to add new benchmarks to the work place, see id. 
at E.8–E.9. 
 336.  Id. at E.14. 
 337.  See supra Part II.B. 
 338.  See id. at E.8–E.9. 
 339.  Id. Harmed borrowers are granted some relief for instances of violations of the work plan, 
but that right to “remediation” is ill-defined and does not appear as a center piece of the goals of the 
consent decree. See id. at E.12 (“In addition to the Servicer’s obligation to cure a Potential Violation 
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individual recourse for those homeowners who have seen their homes 
broken into, their personal effects taken or destroyed, and who have 
suffered intimidation by repeated notices of vacancy and 
abandonment.340  The national mortgage settlement gives these 
individuals no avenue to enforce the contractor oversight standards 
directly and, even if they could, a multi-tiered enforcement mechanism 
that involves a protracted colloquy between the enforcer and the violator 
prior to obtaining a remedy still stands between the distressed 
homeowner and any significant relief.341  While this trifurcated 
enforcement structure—between monitoring committee, monitor, and 
internal review group—might guard against an abuse of discretion by 
the monitor or any one group, it creates an administrative lag and 
fashions a system of enforcement that lacks the ability to respond 
quickly to new abuses.342 
And lastly, what makes the national mortgage settlement a 
particularly inadequate path for recourse in instances of break-in 
foreclosures is that the various provisions of the consent decree, and all 
its intricate mortgage servicing standards, apply solely to the five 
financial institution—Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Ally 
Financial, and Bank of America—that were parties to the litigation.343  It 
does not sweep into its ambit the many other mortgage servicers who 
contract with third party property management firms to assist in pre-
foreclosure activities, and thereby leaves many homeowners without 
even the possibility of seeing meaningful change to a financial system 
that is already substantially one-sided.344 
2. Mixed and Inconsistent Results in Litigation 
Just as with the national mortgage settlement, the chances of an 
aggrieved homeowner finding justice through existing statutory or 
common law remedies are similarly lacking.  As described in the cases 
above, homeowners can never be quite sure exactly what decision will 
through the Corrective Action Plan, Servicer must remediate any material harm to particular borrowers 
identified through work conducted under the Work Plan. In the event that a Servicer has a Potential 
Violation that so far exceeds the Threshold Error Rate for a metric that the Monitor concludes that the 
error is widespread, Servicer shall, under the supervision of the Monitor, identify other borrowers who 
may have been harmed by such noncompliance and remediate all such harms to the extent that the harm 
has not been otherwise remediated.”) (emphasis added). 
 340.  See generally id. 
 341.  See id. at E.8–E.9. 
 342.  See generally id. 
 343.  See, e.g., Chase Consent Judgment, supra note 318. 
 344.  See generally Peter S. Goodman, Lucrative Fees May Deter Efforts to Alter Loans, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 29, 2009, at A1; see also Gretchen Morgenson, Flawed Paperwork Aggravates a 
Foreclosure Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2010, at A1. 
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result from filing suit against either the bank or its contractors.345  The 
results from such litigation are both mixed and inconsistent.346  
Decisions are varied depending upon the cause of action, as well as 
upon the jurisdictional venue where the suit is brought.347  Sometimes a 
party will prevail on some or just one claim, but others will be 
dismissed, and at other times all claims are dispensed with.348  Further, 
each of the lawsuits involves a piece-meal, bootstrapping of mostly tort 
law theories in hopes that at least one theory will be viable.349  And, 
even when the property preservation contractor or the subcontractor is 
deemed liable, the case law varies as to whether liability may be 
imputed up the chain to other parties, such as the bank itself.350  For a 
distressed homeowner already in an economically weakened state, 
facing the fear of losing his home and with little resources, the chances 
of success in court appear quite grim.351  
As a threshold matter, the authority for these break-in foreclosures is 
the mortgage preservation clause—now so commonplace in nearly every 
mortgage document across the country.352  These clauses allow the 
mortgagee to enter the property for purposes of inspection and 
remediation if there is a belief that the property is in danger of being 
damaged.353  Although the occasional “reasonable determination” and 
“reasonable notice” may make its way into the provision, it is by and 
large at the mortgagee’s discretion as to whether to exercise these 
powers.354  Often courts who are confronted with these break-in 
foreclosure cases will hold that the mortgage preservation clause acts as 
a shield for the bank and its agents.355  In theory, the bank cannot be 
deemed to violate the property rights of the owner when the owner has 
expressly consented to granting the bank the authority to enter onto the 
premises.356  
From the bank’s perspective, if the owner has defaulted then typically 
the association between the parties as one of a joint venture-style 
relationship now shifts to a more adversarial posture.357  Banks often 
 345.  See supra Part II.C. 
 346.  Id. 
 347.  Id. 
 348.  Id. 
 349.  Id. 
 350.  Id. 
 351.  Id. 
 352.  See supra Part II.A.3. 
 353.  See supra Part II.C. 
 354.  See supra Part II.A.3. 
 355.  See supra Part II.C and accompanying discussion. 
 356.  Id. 
 357.  See supra Part II.A–B. 
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take the position that it is in its best interest to ensure that it has the 
authority to access and inspect the property to guard against the 
collateral being intentionally damaged.358  As some courts have stated, a 
“default trigger[s] the lender's authority to do whatever was reasonable 
and appropriate to protect its interest” and “in accordance with the terms 
[of the mortgage, the bank] had the right and authority to secure and 
winterize the Property.”359  
But the courts, while citing this mortgage provision, neglect to 
discuss the overriding duty of good faith that is implicit in all 
contracts.360  While the mortgagee might have the authority to enter onto 
the premises if it has a reasonable belief that the collateral is being 
damaged, the existence of that reasonable belief is still a significant 
prerequisite.361  And even if the bank did indeed have the requisite 
reasonable belief such that it would be justified in inspecting the 
property, entering into the premises on a false belief that the property is 
abandoned, much less breaking in the front door and smashing windows, 
are far beyond the good faith obligation that overlays any such 
authority.362  Nevertheless, none of the courts that have cited to the 
mortgage clause as a shield to trespass or invasion of privacy have taken 
into account the long-standing common law contractual requirement of 
good faith.363 
Another deficiency in current law regarding break-in foreclosures 
deals with the ability of the plaintiff to ultimately reach the mortgage 
servicer.  While the contractor may himself be liable for trespass, 
conversion, or any of the other claims, imposing liability on the bank 
itself is not so easily achieved.  This is equally true with respect to 
imposing liability on the property preservation firm itself when the 
damage or illegal acts are done by subcontractors.  In other words, often 
times the parties involved in these break-in style foreclosures appear in 
the form of a chain of various parties with the subcontractors at the 
bottom, the property management firm in the middle, and the mortgage 
servicing bank at the top.  The ability to impose liability should revolve 
 358.  See supra Part II.A.3. 
 359.  Kheder v. Seterus, Inc., No. 308227, 2013 WL 1286020 (Mich. App. Ct. 2013). 
 360.  See, e.g., id.; McCray v. Specialized Loan Servicing, No. RDB-12-02200, 2013 WL 
1316341 (D. Md. 2013); Robison v. Litton Loan Servicing, L.P., No. 09-cv-02677-WYD-MJW, 2011 
WL 1135369 (D. Colo. 2011). 
 361.  See, e.g., McCray, No. RDB-12-02200, 2013 WL 1316341; Robison, No. 09-cv-02677-
WYD-MJW, 2011 WL 1135369. 
 362.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). 
 363.  See Kheder, No. 308227, 2013 WL 1286020; McCray, No. RDB-12-02200, 2013 WL 
1316341; Robison, No. 09-cv-02677-WYD-MJW, 2011 WL 1135369; see also Chunlin Leonhard, 
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around the law of agency—or so one might think. 
The principal must exercise control over the agent.364  The principal 
employs the agent “to perform a service in [the principal’s] affairs and 
who controls or has the right to control the physical conduct of the other 
in the performance of the service.”365  It is through this relationship of 
control and oversight that liability may be imputed to the principal for 
the wrongful acts of the agent.366 
However, typically agreements between banks and property 
management firms and between property management firms and their 
subcontractors explicitly state that the relationship between the parties is 
that of an independent contractor.367  Unlike in the principal-agent 
relationship, the principal does not control the acts of the independent 
contractor with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the 
task.368  Therefore, depending upon the circumstances, an independent 
contractor may be considered an agent, but there are many cases where 
he may not, and thus not subject to the same standard of vicarious 
liability—it is a purely factual question.369  
In addressing this issue in the property management firm context, 
some courts have held that the use of scorecards by a servicer to review 
the effectiveness of the contractor is sufficient evidence of a level of 
control that would give rise to a principal-agent relationship.370  
Similarly, other courts have held that although it may not be clear that 
the bank controlled the method by which the inspection and 
winterization of the property was to be carried out, the fact that the 
contractor received its orders to go to the property from the bank and 
would not have engaged in the alleged wrongful acts otherwise was 
sufficient to create an inference of agency.371 
But most of the time courts are hesitant to find an agency relationship 
without more of a heavy, factual showing of control.372  And, 
 364.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958) (“Agency is the relationship which results 
from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and 
subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.”). 
 365.  Id. § 2. 
 366.  See id. 
 367.  See supra Part II.A.2. 
 368.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958). 
369.    Id.; see also Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. Edwards, 966 F.Supp. 911 (D. Neb. 1997). 
 370.  Lougee Conservancy v. Citimortgage, Inc., 48 A. 3d 774 (Me. 2012). 
 371.  Jackson v. Bank of N.Y., No. 11-cv-6410, 2012 WL 2503956 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
 372.  See, e.g., Tauwab v. Huntington Bank, 2012-Ohio-923, at ¶10 (Oh. Ct. App.) (“Generally, a 
principal, such as Huntington Bank, is not liable for the acts of an independent contractor, such as 
Safeguard, or the independent contractor’s servants.”); see also Kelley v. Southern Pacific Co., 419 U.S. 
318 (US 1974); State Police Ass'n of Mass. v. C.I.R., 125 F.3d 1, (Ms. 1998); Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. 
Edwards, 148 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1998); Shenker v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 374 U.S. 1 (1963); 
Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215 (1909). 
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sophisticated banks and property management firms will craft the 
contract language in such a way as to evidence an independent 
contractor status, arguing that although the inspection and winterization 
of the property is done at the bank’s behest, the method of these 
activities and the tools and other internal processes used by the 
contractor are entirely outside the purview of the bank’s control.373  
Thus, it is not easy for an aggrieved homeowner to reach the mortgagee, 
which is evidenced by the fact that many of the cases filed with respect 
to break-in foreclosures are aimed at only the contractor or 
subcontractor—including the 2013 suit filed by the Illinois attorney 
general—and not the bank also.374 
Trespass claims and invasion of privacy claims also meet a varied 
end.  A claim for trespass arises when an individual intentionally enters 
onto the land of another, without consent, regardless of whether any 
actual harm is caused.375  As discussed above, sometimes courts will 
completely disregard a discussion of the mortgage clause and deem the 
contractor to have effected “intrusion on to the plaintiff’s interest in 
exclusive possession” of his property.376  But many other times the court 
will dismiss the trespass claim by virtue of the contractual consent 
granted by the mortgage to the bank, and thus to any of its 
representatives or surrogates.377  Generally, a claim for invasion of 
privacy occurs when there is an intentional physical intrusion upon “the 
solitude or seclusion” of another “or his private affairs or concerns” 
provided that “the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person.”378  But here again the courts vary widely as to whether they 
will grant recovery under this theory.  Some courts have stated that 
although the contractor wrongfully entered into the property, he lacked 
the requisite intent to intrude into the owner’s privacy and seclusion.379  
Yet others have found a claim for invasion of privacy nonetheless in 
stating that the “[p]laintiff alleges that Defendants invaded his home, 
where he kept private papers containing personal information. These 
facts are sufficient to allege that the matter intruded upon was 
private.”380 
Conversion claims based on an individual exercising domination or 
control over the personal property of another so as to interfere with the 
 373.  See supra Part II.A.2. 
 374.  See supra Part II.C. 
 375.  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 158 (1934). 
 376.  Jackson v. Bank of New York, 2012 WL 2503956 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
 377.  See e.g., McCray v. Specialized Loan Servicing, 2013 WL 1316341 (D. Maryland 2013). 
 378.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
 379.  Lougee, 48 A.3d 774. 
 380.  Jackson, No. 11-cv-6410, 2012 WL 2503956. 
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owner’s control also succeed on a variable basis.381  These claims are 
brought in connection with damage to chattels—such as furniture, 
household items, or other personal property—that occur during the 
contractor’s entry into the home.382  Some courts have held that, 
although the contractor took dominion or control over the owner’s 
property, if the property was returned within a reasonable period of time 
thereafter then it could not be said that the taking caused a “serious” 
interferences with the owner’s rights in that property.383  
Similarly, negligence theories in break-in foreclosure cases 
sometimes prevail based on the notion that the contractor owes a duty to 
act with care when executing its inspection and winterization duties,384 
but sometimes specific state-related nuances of the negligence analysis 
have mitigated against imposing tort-based negligence liability.  One 
such instance of the latter includes a case where the court held that when 
the duty of the contractor arises out of the contractual duty originating 
from the mortgage between the bank and the borrower, a claim for a 
breach of the duty of care is barred.385   
And lastly, intentional infliction of emotional distress is the least 
prevailing theory typically brought in connection with break-in 
foreclosure suits.386  This action requires that the plaintiff show that the 
extreme or outrageous conduct was intentionally done to cause severe 
emotional distress.387  Courts generally state that, while certainly 
upsetting, the winterization of one’s home or minimal damage to one’s 
personal property does not constitute extreme or outrageous conduct.388   
Further, while having one’s home broken into might cause one to feel 
upset, embarrassed, or defeated, those feelings do not rise to the level of 
severe emotional distress.389  Very few courts have been willing to 
recognize the often significant psychological and emotional trauma, at 
least in the minds of the victims, which occurs when arriving home to 
find one’s house has been invaded, one’s personal belongings damaged 
or missing, or the doors, locks, and windows of the home damaged.390 
 381.  See supra Part II.C. 
 382.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A (1965). 
 383.  See Lougee, 48 A.3d 774. 
 384.  See id; see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 281 (1934). 
 385.  Jackson, No. 11-cv-6410, 2012 WL 2503956. 
 386.  See supra Part II.C. 
 387.  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) (“One who by extreme and 
outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to 
liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily 
harm.”). 
 388.  Jackson, No. 11-cv-6410, 2012 WL 2503956. 
 389.  In re Carpenter, No. 11-20896-TPA, 2013 WL 1953275, at *15 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. May 7, 
2013). 
 390.  Lougee, 48 A.3d 774; see also Gordon v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 964 F. Supp. 2d 937 
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So while various existing legal theories might provide an occasional 
avenue of recourse for aggrieved homeowners, success is anything but 
certain.391  The nuances and complexities of these contract and tort-
based legal theories vary from state to state and are often superimposed 
with special statutory or jurisprudential overlays that can limit or modify 
the ability to achieve a just result.392  Courts view the severity of these 
break-in foreclosures differently, and thus differ on whether relief 
should be granted.393  Furthermore, courts have been extremely mixed 
on whether liability can be imputed up the chain to the property 
management company or even the bank/mortgage servicer itself.394  
Lastly, sometimes courts uphold the validity of the mortgage 
preservation clauses—the centerpiece of these pre-foreclosure 
practices—while neglecting to discuss the overriding obligation of good 
faith, while at other times they choose not to discuss these provisions 
altogether.395  The only thing that is certain is that homeowners who 
experience break-in foreclosure are left feeling lost and helpless, and, as 
it turns out, existing laws have very little to offer them in the way of 
justice.396  
B. A Call for Action: Proposed Solutions 
The extent to which the American economy, particularly the housing 
market, has rebounded is still unclear.397  And despite a host of reforms, 
bailouts, and public shaming regarding the housing crisis and its 
originators, more robust and meaningful laws and regulations are needed 
to ensure these the types of abusive break-in-style foreclosures are 
halted.398  The national mortgage settlement, while having the 
possibility of making seismic changes in the mortgage lending and 
servicing industry, is a long-term process of systemic reform and only 
(N.D. Ind. 2013). 
 391.  See supra Part II.C. 
 392.  See id. and accompanying case law discussion. 
 393.  See id. 
 394.  See id. 
 395.  See id. 
 396.  See generally id. 
 397.  See Hill, supra note 2; see also Elvina Nawaguna, U.S. Sees Fewer Foreclosures as Banks 
Reclaim More Homes, DAILY FIN. (May 15, 2014, 6:00AM), 
http://www.dailyfinance.com/2014/05/15/fewer-home-foreclosures/; Lucia Mutikani, Small-Business 
Confidence Springs Back to Pre-Crisis Levels, DAILY FIN. (May 13, 2014, 7:46AM), 
http://www.dailyfinance.com/2014/05/13/small-business-confidence-back-precrisis-levels/; A Rickety 
Rebound, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21583686-global-
economy-gaining-momentum-only-america-acceleration-likely-last. 
 398.  See supra Part II and accompanying discussion. 
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directly impacts five major US banks.399  Further, unfortunately the 
settlement offers very little in the way of immediate relief or practical 
recourse for everyday homeowners who find themselves aggrieved by 
these aggressive and abusive foreclosure practices.400   
By the same token, litigation by private individuals against banks and 
their third party contractors have provided little in the way of solid 
results.401  Case law is mixed as to whether relief can be granted, with 
some courts refusing to impute liability to the ultimate mortgage 
servicer while others upholding the property preservation clause in the 
mortgages as a way to undercut the claims of the plaintiff.402  While 
existing state law concepts might hold the possibility of relief to 
distressed homeowners, the chances of success are shaky and any such 
attempts involve the expenditure of substantial sums in attorney’s fees 
and court costs on the front end.403  A more dynamic and immediate 
series of reforms are needed to address current claims by distressed 
homeowners, as well as prevent future abuses of this kind.404 
Such a framework must be broad-based so as to avoid a piece-meal 
approach that invites loop holes or forum shopping; it must be effective 
so that a violation does not result in a toothless remedy, and it must be 
comprehensive such that it impacts not only the subcontractor who 
breaks into the home and removes the personal items, but also the 
mortgagee/lender on whose authority the property preservation firm and 
all lower contractors are acting.405  The entity that is best posed to help 
achieve these wide-ranging goals, in part, is the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB).406  This newly formed federal watchdog 
agency is charged with making markets “for consumer financial 
products and services work for Americans—whether they are applying 
for a mortgage, choosing among credit cards, or using any number of 
other consumer financial products.”407  
 399.  See supra Part I.C. 
 400.  See supra Part III.A.I. 
 401.  See supra Part III.A.II. 
 402.  See id. 
 403.  See id. 
 404.  See supra Part III.A. 
 405.  See id. 
 406.  See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Financial Services Industry’s Misguided Quest to 
Undermine the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 881 (2012); Arthur 
E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act's Expansion of State Authority to Protect Consumers of Financial 
Services, 36 J. CORP. L. 893 (2011); Edmund L. Andrews, Banks Balk at Agency Meant to Aid 
Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2009, at B1. 
 407.  About Us, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-
bureau/ (last visited May 28, 2015); see also Michael C. Nissim-Sabat, Capturing this Watchdog? The 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Keeping the Special Interests Out of its House, 40 W. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1 (2012). 
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Although the law of mortgage foreclosures is chiefly the domain of 
the states,408 various federal laws interact with state law in governing the 
process whereby banks foreclosure on their mortgages.409  Among the 
various powers accorded to the CFPB by the Dodd-Frank Act include 
the ability to regulate the operations, policies, and processes of mortgage 
servicers and mortgage originators.410  It is through this power that the 
CFPB has the greatest potential to make a firm stand in bringing break-
in foreclosures to an abrupt halt.  The following are recommendations as 
to how the CFPB, through their regulatory authority over mortgage 
servicers and mortgage originators, as well as state legislatures can bring 
an end to these types of foreclosure abuses. 
1. Enacting Broad Third Party Provider Oversight Regulations 
The first thing that should be done is that certain aspects of the third 
party provider oversight provisions of the national mortgage settlement 
should be promulgated into industry-wide standards by the CFPB.  
These standards and their metrics provide a helpful framework of checks 
and balances that should assist banks—who perhaps many times may be 
unaware of the misdeeds of their contractors and subcontractors—to 
have processes and systems in place to police misconduct.411  These 
standards would help ensure that contractors are properly interviewed, 
credentialed, hired, and supervised throughout the course of their 
service.412  
The CFPB, through their auditors and analysts, should be charged 
with ensuring that mortgage servicers who engage these third party 
contractors are able to provide the proper documentation to substantiate 
that a system of checks and balances has been put in place for each of 
their contractors.  This would be in the same vein as how it is envisioned 
that the national mortgage settlement monitor and the internal review 
 408.  See, e.g., Higley v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 910 F. Supp. 2d 1249 (D. Or. 2012). 
 409.  See, e.g., Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-142, 121 Stat. 
1803 (2007); The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act of 2003, 50 App. U.S.C. §§ 501-597 (2003); 
Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 111-22, §§ 701-704, 123 Stat. 1632, 1660-1663 
(2009). 
 410.  Eric J. Mogilnicki & Melissa S. Malpass, The First Year of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau: An Overview, 68 BUS. LAW. 557 (2013); Adam J. Levitin, Andrey D. Pavlovd, & 
Susan M. Wachter, The Dodd-Frank Act and Housing Finance: Can It Restore Private Risk Capital to 
the Securitization Market?, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 155, 163 (2012) (“The CFPB has the ability to regulate 
mortgage origination practices beyond the reforms in title XIV of the Dodd-Frank Act. It has the power 
to make rules under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, the Truth in Lending Act, the SAFE 
Mortgage Licensing Act, the Interstate Land Sales Act, and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and also 
a broad power to proscribe unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices.”). 
 411.  See supra Part III.A.1. 
 412.  See id. 
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group would conduct periodic tests and inspections for the five banks 
subject to the mortgage foreclosure settlement.413  It might also be 
advantageous, if sufficient regulatory authority is present, for the CFPB 
to impose quality standards on the Mortgage Field Services Industry as a 
whole, thereby addressing the break-in foreclosure threat both indirectly 
through the servicer’s duties and directly through obligations imposed 
on the contractors themselves.  These tasks and functions would fall 
squarely within the goals of the CFPB because ensuring the safety and 
fairness of the mortgage market—which would include the foreclosure 
of mortgages and the treatment of homeowners after default, both by 
servicers and those who support them—is a substantial part of the 
agency’s mission.414 
2. Creating a Private Cause of Action for Break-in Foreclosures 
The second thing that could be done is for state legislatures—if not 
Congress itself or the CFPB if sufficient regulatory authority exists—to 
fashion a private cause of action that distressed homeowners could avail 
themselves of when faced with unfair foreclosure practices. In the spirit 
of the various state laws prohibiting unfair trade practices,415 this action 
would be specifically tailored to those instances whereby homeowners 
suffer from aggression, intimidation, or over reaching by their mortgage 
servicers or any of their agents or contractors.  Many state unfair trade 
practices acts provide specific examples of activities that fall within the 
statute’s prohibited acts, and break-in foreclosure activities could be 
similarly added to these enumerations. 
Furthermore, this cause of action should allow for the homeowner to 
go directly against the banking institution and other indirect contractors, 
without the need to show the traditional agency relationship between the 
bank and the subcontractors and between any intervening parties.416  
Since the mortgage servicer is the party in whose interest and on whose 
instruction the contractor is conducting the inspection and/or 
winterization activities, it only makes sense that the bank should be 
 413.  See id. 
 414.  See generally Joseph J. Reilly & Shara M. Chang, An Overview of the CFPB’s Ability-to-
Repay/Qualified Mortgage Rule, 32 No. 7 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP. 1 (2013). 
 415.  See CAROLYN L. CARTER, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A 50-STATE REPORT ON 
UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES (2009), available at 
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/car_sales/UDAP_Report_Feb09.pdf. It should be noted that state 
consumer protection laws vary greatly and do not all provide the same level of protection to consumers. 
Id.  For instance, “[i]n addition to Michigan and Rhode Island, three states—Louisiana, New 
Hampshire, and In addition to Michigan and Rhode Island, three states—Louisiana, New Hampshire, 
and Virginia—exempt most lenders and creditors from UDAP statutes, while another 15 leave 
significant gaps or ambiguities in their coverage of creditors.” See id. at 3. 
 416.  See supra Part III.2. 
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ultimately responsible for supervising, in substantial part, the activities 
of its contractor.417  This is particularly true since the bank holds such a 
superior position of power and resources vis-à-vis the economically 
weak and distressed homeowner in default.418  And lastly, this form of 
automatic liability already exists in the context of Uniform Commercial 
Code article nine in connection with violations of the peace by 
contractors hired by secured parties in the self-help repossession 
process, as well as the prohibition on allowing the secured party to 
contractually define what constitutes a violation of the peace.419 
And lastly, this civil cause of action should provide for attorney’s fees 
and court costs so that attorneys will be incentivized to take on these 
cases of break-in foreclosures.  Distressed homeowners will have little 
financial resources available to hire lawyers and file expensive lawsuits 
so the action must allow for recovery of these costs by the prevailing 
party.420  However, the award of attorney’s fees should be reciprocal so 
as to discourage homeowners or plaintiffs’ attorneys from making 
frivolous claims in an attempt to delay the legitimate foreclosure 
process.  
Similarly, it would also be beneficial if the government (either by the 
state attorney general in the case of an expansion of state unfair trade 
practices law or by the CFPB under an administrative action) could 
bring an action on behalf of aggrieved homeowners—much like as was 
done by the Illinois attorney general—if it so chooses.421  In this way the 
government can go after particularly egregious instances of abusive 
foreclosures on behalf of homeowners and make a broader statement 
about the impermissibility of such practices.  By providing a civil cause 
of action homeowners will be able to obtain immediate relief while the 
wheels of the larger reform efforts continue to turn. 
3. Curtailing the Use of Property Preservation Clauses 
Finally, the use of property preservation clauses in residential 
mortgages should be substantially curtailed.  In many ways these 
provisions cause the property owner to essentially forfeit some of the 
major and most essential elements of ownership in favor of the 
 417.  See supra Part II.A–B. 
 418.  See Nicole Lutes Fuentes, Defrauding the American Dream: Predatory Lending in Latino 
Communities and Reform of California’s Lending Law, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1279 (2009); Albert Choi & 
George Triantis, The Effect of Bargaining Power on Contract Design, 98 VA. L. REV. 1665 (2012). 
 419.  See U.C.C. § 9-609(b)(2) (2010); U.C.C. § 9-602(6) (2010). 
 420.  See generally Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law & Economics of Subprime 
Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009). 
 421.  See supra Part II.C. 
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mortgagee.422  For instance, the typical language states that the lender 
may make reasonable entries upon and inspections of the Property.423  
This “property” is not a commercial building or an industrial facility; 
rather, this is someone’s home.  It is where they sleep at night, keep all 
their personal effects, eat their meals, and experience some of the most 
intimate moments of life.  No one should have the authority to make 
entries onto the premises whenever they deem it to be “reasonable.” 
Furthermore, the only qualification to an otherwise unfettered right to 
entry is a determination of reasonableness which is made at the sole 
discretion of the party seeking to enter.424  Such a one-sided 
determination invites abuse and overreaching. 
Also, the mortgage preservation provision typically allows the lender 
to enter the interior of the improvements on the property if the bank 
believes they have reasonable cause.425  Assumedly reasonable cause 
would mean that the property is under threat of eminent damage or if the 
property has been abandoned and, by virtue of its vacancy, will be 
subject to eminent damage.426  However, as discussed above, many 
times bank contractors are deeming property to be abandoned when 
there are a myriad of external signs to indicate that the occupants are 
merely away from the home at the moment.427  
The CFPB—in conjunction with the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency that regulates Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—should prohibit 
the unfettered use of overreaching mortgage preservation clauses and 
reform the existing uniform property preservation provisions so as to set 
limits regarding what kinds of unilateral entries a mortgagee can make 
onto the mortgaged property.  As a creditor, taking steps to protect 
collateralized property that may be damaged or destroyed is entirely 
reasonable and fair. This right should be made clear and should be 
preserved.  However, it should only be done when balanced against the 
property rights of the homeowner.  Baring a situation where the threat of 
damage or destruction of the property is eminent, the servicer should 
have to give a specifically stipulated period of notice—at least forty-two 
hours—prior to having the right to disturb the possession of the 
homeowner during this pre-foreclosure phase.  To otherwise grant a 
mortgagee (or its contractors) such cavalier rights to the homeowner’s 
property undermines the foreclosure process and the safeguards that 
have been put in place under state and constitutional law to prohibit 
 422.  See supra Part II.A. 
 423.  See FREDDIE MAC: NEW YORK MORTGAGE: FORM 3033 , supra note 211. 
 424.  See id. 
 425.  See id. 
 426.  See supra Part II.B. 
 427.  See id. 
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overreaching and abuse.428 
V. CONCLUSION 
As time goes by—and home buying has started to inch up and the 
squeeze on credit has begun to loosen—it is easy to forget the horrors 
and abuses of the financial crisis.429  Settling back into a calm sense of 
normalcy is both comforting and easy.  In many ways such a sense of 
calm and security is quite predictable.  With the substantial expenditure 
of public funds used in order to stabilize and steady the financial 
sector,430 coupled with reforms to financial markets and the ways in 
which mortgage loans are made, bought, and sold,431 as well as with the 
settlement of a massive, nation-wide lawsuit against some of the largest 
contributors to the housing crash,432 one would be entirely justified in 
believing that these events would have caused a systemic change in the 
way the U.S. housing and financial markets operate.  Long gone would 
be the days of subprime lending, the fraudulent marketing of mortgage 
securities, and practices such as robosigning—or so it would seem.433 
Nonetheless, it is at these times of perceived calm that lawmakers, 
policy advocates, and lawyers should be the most vigilant.  A wave of 
abusive and overreaching break-in foreclosures has swept across the 
country over the course of the past year and a half.434  Financial 
institutions, faced with a significant and still growing number of 
properties awaiting foreclosure, have taken to hiring third party 
contractors to help manage their properties.435  These acts include 
determinations of homeowner abandonment and damage to the 
collateral, which often entails entering the premises and securing the 
property.436  While such practices seem completely justifiable—and, for 
that matter, advisable for the creditor—the realities of how these 
activities are being carried out are far from how they were intended.437  
These property preservation contractors, and often through additional 
subcontractors, have in many cases been found to have illegally broken 
 428. For an overview of the foreclosure process and its procedural safeguards, see FORECLOSURE 
OVERVIEW: REALTYTRAC.COM (last visited May 26, 2014), http://www.realtytrac.com/real-estate-
guides/foreclosure/. 
 429.  See Mutikani, supra note 397. 
 430.  See supra Part I.B. 
 431.  See id. 
 432.  See supra Part I.C. 
 433.  See supra Part I.A. 
 434.  See supra Part II.B. 
 435.  See supra Part II.A. 
 436.  See supra Part II.A.1–3. 
 437.  See supra Part II.B. 
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into homes, engaged in acts of intimidation, destroyed personal 
property, and effectively deprived the lawful owner of possession and 
control of his property, all without proper process.438  The crux of this 
power, exercised by mortgage servicers through this hierarchy of 
contractors, lies in an obscure but universally used clause in almost all 
mortgage contracts.439  This clause grants the lender almost unfettered 
authority to enter into the property, subject only to its self-determined 
reasoned discretion.440  
And despite the fact that financial institutions have seen a tremendous 
backlash, both in the form of public opinion and through the national 
mortgage settlement regarding abusive foreclosure practices, these new 
practices by bank contractors has become wide-spread.441  As of the 
time of this writing private party litigation is pending in over thirty 
states and a class-action style suit has been filed by the state of Illinois 
on behalf of dozens of its aggrieved citizens.442  But a review of the 
third party oversight provisions in the national mortgage settlement, as 
well as the disposition of those cases involving break-in foreclosures 
that have already been decided across the country, evidence that current 
laws and regulations are significantly lacking.443  Neither provide an 
adequate remedy for homeowners who have faced the indignity and 
damage associated with these break-in foreclosures.444  
In order to better provide an avenue of recourse for these 
homeowners, this Article recommends that a new regulatory framework 
be adopted by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to govern the 
responsibilities of financial institutions with regard to the hiring, 
credentialing, supervision, and oversight of third party contractors.445  
Further, a private cause of action should be created which would allow 
aggrieved homeowners—or the public prosecutors on their behalf—to 
seek recourse against third party contractors and the mortgage servicers 
who engage them under an unfair housing practices theory of 
recovery.446  Lastly, mortgage preservation clauses should be strictly 
curtailed so as to stamp out the current use of overreaching language in 
mortgages that has essentially caused many borrowers to give away their 
most important home ownership rights—exclusive possession and 
 438.  See id. 
 439.  See supra Part II.A.3. 
 440.  See id. 
 441.  See supra Part II.C. 
 442.  See id. 
 443.  See supra Part III.A. 
 444.  See id. 
 445.  See supra Part III.B.1. 
 446.  See supra Part III.B.2. 
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control—prior to being accorded due process.447 
Through the enactment of such a scheme of reforms, financial 
institutions, which play such an integral and necessary part in the 
housing sector, will be better incentivized to police the authority they 
bestow on third party contractors and the activities that these contractors 
carry out in the bank’s name.448  Further, homeowners will be given an 
adequate judicial remedy when faced with a break-in foreclosure.449  
And finally, the use of overreaching clauses in mortgages contracts will 
be curtailed so as to hinder these practices from occurring, under color 
of consent, in the future.450   
 447.  See supra Part III.B.3. 
 448.  See supra Part III.B. 
 449.  See id. 
 450.  See id. 
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